Folterverbot und nukleares Tabu in der DiskussionDer vorliegende Artikel nimmt sozialkonstruktivistische Theorien der Norminternalisierung als Ausgangspunkt und zeigt deren theoretische Schwachstellen auf, nämlich (1) dass sie Akteure bzw. Akteurshandeln aus dem Blickfeld geraten lassen, sobald eine Norm das sogenannte Internalisierungsstadium erreicht hat, und dass sie (2) aus einem inhärenten Fortschrittsglauben heraus die Möglichkeit einer späteren Schwächung einer internalisierten Norm nicht mehr in Erwägung ziehen. Anhand zweier empirischer Gegenbeispiele -des Folterverbots und des nuklearen Tabus in den USA -wird untersucht, wie es möglich ist, dass eine bereits internalisierte Norm von Seiten des Akteurs wieder in Frage gestellt wird und auf diese Weise Tabus geschwächt werden, d. h. erodieren können. In der Schlussfolgerung werden die Gründe aufgezeigt, aufgrund derer sich internalisierte Normen, obwohl gemeinhin als stabil erachtet, immer noch als fragil erweisen können.

Whether and how Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) can and should be regulated is intensely debated among governments, scholars, and campaigning activists. This article argues that the strategy of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots to obtain a legally binding instrument to regulate LAWS within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is not likely to be effective, as it is modeled after previous humanitarian disarmament successes and not tailored to the specifics of the issue. This assessment is based on a systematic comparison of the autonomous weapons case with the cases of blinding laser weapons and anti-personnel landmines that makes use of an analytical framework consisting of issue-related, actor-related, and institution-related campaign strategy components. Considering the differences between these three cases, the authors recommend that the LAWS campaign strategy be adjusted in terms of institutional choices, substance, and regulatory design. KEYWORDS Humanitarian disarmament; anti-personnel landmines; blinding laser weapons; convention on certain conventional weapons; artificial intelligence; lethal autonomous weapons systems Humankind is on the cusp of the fourth industrial revolution. How we live, work, and communicate is changing. A key feature of this new epoch is automation, enabled by breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI). 1 Machines today are able to perform more numerous and complex tasks with minimal or no human assistance or supervision. Naturally, militaries around the globe also intend to benefit from this development. As a result, what has come to be

In addition to its successful mobilization in stigmatization and norm‐setting processes on anti‐personnel landmines and cluster munitions, the principle of distinction as enshrined in International Humanitarian Law also figures prominently in the debate on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Proponents of a ban on LAWS frame these as indiscriminate, that is, unable to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and thus as inherently unlawful. The flip side of this particular legal argument is, however, that LAWS become acceptable when considered capable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians. We thus argue, first, that this particular legal basis for the call for a ban on LAWS might be rendered obsolete by technological progress increasing discriminatory weapon capabilities. Second, we argue that the argument is normatively troubling as it suggests that, as long as civilians remain unharmed, attacking combatants with LAWS is acceptable. Consequently, we find that the legal principle of distinction is not the overall strongest argument to mobilize when trying to stigmatize and ban LAWS. A more fundamental, ethical argument within the debate about LAWS – and one less susceptible to ‘technological fixes’ – should be emphasized instead, namely that life and death decisions on the battlefield should always and in principle be made by humans only.