We assess the long-run growth effects of automation in the overlapping generations framework. Although automation implies constant returns to capital and, thus, an AK production side of the economy, positive long-run growth does not emerge. The reason is that automation suppresses wage income, which is the only source of investment in the overlapping generations model. Our result stands in sharp contrast to the representative agent setting with automation, where sustained long-run growth is possible even without technological progress. Our analysis therefore provides a cautionary tale that the underlying modeling structure of saving/investment decisions matters for the derived economic impact of automation. In addition, we show that a robot tax has the potential to raise per capita output and welfare at the steady state. However, it cannot induce a takeoff toward positive long-run growth.

The design and analysis of optimal monetary policy is usually guided by the paradigm of homogeneous rational expectations. Instead, we examine the dynamic consequences of design and implementation strategies, when the actual economy features expectational heterogeneity. Agents have either rational or adaptive expectations. Consequently the central bank's ability to achieve pricestability under heterogeneous expectations depends on its objective and implementation strategy. An expectations-based reaction function, which appropriately conditions on private sector expectations, performs exceptionally well. However, once the objective introduces policy inertia, popular strategies can fail. These results call for new implementation strategies under interest rate stabilization. JEL Classification: E52, D84

We quantify the impact of government spending shocks in the US. Thereby, we control for fiscal foresight, a specific limited information problem (LIP) by utilizing the narrative approach. Moreover, we surmount the generic LIP inherent in vector autoregressions (VARs) by a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) approach. We find that a positive deficit-financed defence shock raises output by more than in a VAR (e.g. 2.61 vs. 2.04 for peak multipliers). Furthermore, our evidence suggests that consumption is crowded in. These results are robust to variants of controlling for fiscal foresight and reveal the crucial role of the LIP in fiscal VARs

We estimate state-dependent government spending multipliers for the United States. We use a factor-augmented interacted vector autoregression (FAIVAR) model. This allows us to capture the time-varying monetary policy characteristics including the recent zero interest rate lower bound (ZLB) state, to account for the state of the business cycle and to address the limited information problem typically inherent in VARs. We identify government spending shocks by sign restrictions and use a government spending growth forecast series to account for the effects of anticipated fiscal policy. In our baseline specification, we find that government spending multipliers in a recession range from 3.56 to 3.79 at the ZLB. Away from the ZLB, multipliers in recessions range from 2.31 to 3.05. Several robustness analyses confirm that multipliers are higher, when the interest rate is lower and that multipliers in recessions exceed multipliers in expansions. Our results are consistent with theories that predict larger multipliers at the ZLB.