Building resilience into today’s complex infrastructures is critical to the daily functioning of society and its ability to withstand and recover from natural disasters, epidemics, and cyber-threats. This study proposes quantitative measures that capture and implement the definition of engineering resilience advanced by the National Academy of Sciences. The approach is applicable across physical, information, and social domains. It evaluates the critical functionality, defined as a performance function of time set by the stakeholders. Critical functionality is a source of valuable information, such as the integrated system resilience over a time interval, and its robustness. The paper demonstrates the formulation on two classes of models: 1) multi-level directed acyclic graphs, and 2) interdependent coupled networks. For both models synthetic case studies are used to explore trends. For the first class, the approach is also applied to the Linux operating system. Results indicate that desired resilience and robustness levels are achievable by trading off different design parameters, such as redundancy, node recovery time, and backup supply available. The nonlinear relationship between network parameters and resilience levels confirms the utility of the proposed approach, which is of benefit to analysts and designers of complex systems and networks.

In this paper we study the interplay between epidemic spreading and risk perception on multiplex networks. The basic idea is that the effective infection probability is affected by the perception of the risk of being infected, which we assume to be related to the fraction of infected neighbors, as introduced by Bagnoli et al. [Phys. Rev. E 76, 061904 (2007)PLEEE81539-375510.1103/PhysRevE.76.061904]. We rederive previous results using a self-organized method that automatically gives the percolation threshold in just one simulation. We then extend the model to multiplex networks considering that people get infected by physical contacts in real life but often gather information from an information network, which may be quite different from the physical ones. The similarity between the physical and the information networks determines the possibility of stopping the infection for a sufficiently high precaution level: if the networks are too different, there is no means of avoiding the epidemics.