International audienceThis paper develops a theory of the centralization of firms engaged in multi-market collusive agreements. A centralized organization (called the unitary or U-form) allows price coordination across several markets, whereas with decentralized (the multidivisional or M-form) firms the probability that the antitrust authority will find evidence of collusion on one market while investigating the other is lower. We show that the firm’s choice of internal structure depends to a large extent on product substitutability and the instruments used by the antitrust authority

We propose a model to analyze competition between an on-line course and a traditional brick-and-mortar supply for higher education. The brick and mortar supplier is physically located and students pay a transportation cost to attend the traditional course. On the contrary, the on-line course is free, without transportation cost but students incurred a fixed homogeneous disutility when choosing this type of course. We derive the optimal fee policy of a single university as a function of its location and the fixed cost associated with the on-line course. We also study the impact of distant learning on the competition between two brick and mortar universities. One university is assumed to enjoy a central position, whereas the other one is located at the extreme left of the town. We discuss equilibria and market sharing in nonregulated (i.e pure fee competition) and regulated (i.e. quantity competition) settings. Finally, public issues are addressed. In particular, the socially optimal provision of MOOC and the supply of MOOC by universities are carefully discussed.

The fight against cartels is a priority for antitrust authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. What differs between the EU and the US is not the basic toolkit for achieving deterrence, but to whom it is targeted. In the EU, pecuniary sanctions against the firm are the only instruments available to the Commission, while in the US criminal sanctions are also widely employed. The aim of this paper is to compare two different types of fines levied on managerial firms when they collude. We consider a profit based fine as opposed to a delegation based fine, with the latter targeting the manager in a more direct way. Under the assumption of revenue equivalence, we find that the delegation based fine, although distortive, is more effective in deterring cartels than the profit based one. When evaluating social welfare, a trade-off between deterrence and output distortion can arise. However, if the antitrust authority focuses on consumer surplus, then the delegation based fine is to be preferred. JEL Codes: K21, L44, K42, L21