In this article, we demonstrate how judgecraft, though mundane in the context of housing possession proceedings in England, involves the client-processing mentality suggested in Lipsky's work on street-level bureaucracy. Although they may be regarded as mundane, the consequences of these proceedings may well be dire, producing homelessness and other forms of extreme housing need. Lipsky helps us, because his work enables us to think about the factors that make up `being a District Judge'. Having discussed the background to housing possession proceedings, including their growth, we discuss this client-processing mentality in the context of the ways in which District Judges seek to control their clients as well as processes in the courtroom. Repeat-players are moulded by individual District Judges through routines, discipline, and just knowing what is expected. In particular, crucial decisions are made as to the worthiness of claimants and occupiers. As a result, relationships of trust develop which facilitate a `rubber-stamping' approach. In the conclusion, we reflect on the value of Lipsky's work as well as its limits in this context.

In this article, we draw on data obtained in interviews with District Judges about the factors which they say influence the exercise of their discretion in possession proceedings. Analysing the data set enabled us to create three ideal types of judicial decision—making which we have labelled ‘liberal’, ‘patrician’, and formalist'. We discuss the differences between each ideal type across five different variables: the District Judge role; approach; view of occupiers; the problem; behaviour of occupiers. Our data demonstrate a set of reasons to explain different approaches and outcomes between different District Judges (as well as the perhaps unlikely identification of a ‘maverick’ or ‘idiosyncratic’ style of judging). We conclude by suggesting on the basis of our data that, despite calls to structure or remove the discretion from District Judges, any such changes are unlikely to have much effect.

If the main aim of civil law is to regulate and improve matters for the future, by, for example, making orders about the future behaviour of parties rather than punishing past behaviour (criminal law), then a fundamental question is whether the civil law is adequately fulfilling these requirements regarding domestic violence. This is a particularly pertinent question given the implementation of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. This article will examine whether the Government's reforms offer protection to all victims of domestic violence as proposed in the Consultation Paper 'Safety and Justice' and will suggest that instead of achieving a clear coherent framework for dealing with domestic violence, the Act has taken a step towards blurring the boundaries between the criminal and civil law.

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms dealt with cases where they felt that the proposed outcome was particularly unfair to one party or unlikely to be endorsed by a court, and asks how mediation practice -and legal practice -may come under pressure to change in this brave new world.