This paper compares two judgments of constitutional courts (French and German) assessing the constitutionality of statutes concerning veil-wearing and focuses on the underlying conceptions of ‘living together’. This means that what is actually compared is the self-understanding of the respective majority in the two societies as stated in the decisions. This is done by disassembling the concept of ‘living together’ into three elements: the notion of the individual, the meaning of belonging to the national community and the space accorded to religion in public. Each section of this paper examines one of these elements as they are entailed in the judgments and positions them critically within the respective legal cultural and historical contexts. The main aim of this paper is methodological in nature and is namely to show how comparative legal cultural studies can avoid essentialisation and rather highlight the complexity of every cultural context.

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463literatur 79 (2015) vollständig und ohne substanziellen Tiefgang behandelt. Es fällt deshalb nicht mehr ins Gewicht, dass über die im Titel angekündigte "Practice" kein Wort verloren wird. Als abschließendes Fazit ist festzuhalten, dass das Werk von Havel/Sanchez zur systematischen Durchdringung des internationalen Luftrechts leider nur wenig beiträgt.

new concept. After all, the two most commonly cited examples of 'instant custom' in the literature are space law and the Truman proclamation (which are, of course, two of Scharf's four examples). More generally, the criteria for assessing the 'sufficiency' of state practice in the customary law formation process-duration, generality and consistency-have long been accepted as being both interrelated and context-specific. Scharf rightly notes that, even in normal circumstances (ie, where there is no moment of fundamental change), 'there exists no agreed-upon general formula for identifying how many states are needed and how much time must transpire to generate a rule of customary international law' (59). When one reflects on this, the conceptualization of the 'context of fundamental change' as a third element of customary law formation becomes problematic. This reviewer would argue that fundamental change is just one factor relevant to the application of the criteria for assessing the 'sufficiency' of the first element of custom formationstate practice-and not a distinct element in itself. Customary international law is ultimately formed by the acceptance of any given state practice as representing evidence of legal change, based on a combination of the duration, uniformity and generality of that practice. How those criteria are applied, and thus what will be 'acceptable' in any particular instance, is related to many things: power, relevant state interest, the importance of the rule in question and-of coursewhether the practice has occurred in the context of, or because of, a moment of fundamental (political/military/technological/economic) change. While the notion that fundamental change can lead to expedited custom formation is relatively uncontentious, the framing of this as a separate criterion distinct from any other relevant context-specific factor is therefore rather more debatable. In any event, this is an excellent book. It is clearly and engagingly written (as anyone familiar with Scharf's previous work would expect). The research underpinning it is similarly faultless. Moreover, it is short and to the point: its arguments are both concisely made and precisely targeted. This book is ultimately an extremely important addition to the literature. Its thesis is at the same time indisputable (in and of itself) and yet highly contestable both in terms of its framing and application to specific examples. Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change will undoubtedly spark important debate and further research on the process of expedited custom: a process that is controversial and potentially dangerous, but which-as Scharf ably demonstrates-undeniably occurs.