I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games, proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules (or 'policies') generate Expansions, Contractions and Revisions, and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly (multiple) sources of answers, and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude with some remarks about the potential extensions of interrogative games, with respect to some issues in the theory of belief change.

This paper examines critically the reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' proposed jointly by M.B. Hintikka (1939( -1987( ) and J. Hintikka (1929( -2016 in the 1980s, and its successor, the interrogative model of inquiry (imi) developed by J. Hintikka and his collaborators in the 1990s. The Hintikkas' model explicitly used game theory in order to formalize a naturalistic approach to inquiry, but the imi abandoned both the game-theoretic formalism, and the naturalistic approach. It is argued that the latter better supports the claim that the imi provides a 'logic of discovery', and safeguards its empirical adequacy. Technical changes necessary to this interpretation are presented, and examples are discussed, both formal and informal, that are better analyzed when these changes are in place. The informal examples are borrowed from Conan Doyle's The Case of Silver Blaze, a favorite of M.B. and J. Hintikka.

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