Nigeria has recently issued the Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste & Pollution) Regulations 2018. Its objective is to completely phase out gas flaring which has persisted notwithstanding several efforts to encourage associated gas utilisation and discourage the process. This work assesses the Regulations in light of enabling legislation, particularly the Petroleum Act 1969 and the Associated Gas (Reinjection) Act 1979 to address questions that arise regarding some of its innovative aspects such as the taking of all flare gas by the Federal Government of Nigeria and a new permits regime to enable third-party investors access to petroleum lease areas to effect the taking of the flare gas. It argues that public interest is at the heart of the Regulations and considering enabling legislation and previous case law, justifies its provisions given the pollution and economic waste ill-effects of gas flaring.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been at the forefront of securing environmental justice for the people of Nigeria’s Niger Delta suffering the effects of pollution arising from petroleum exploitation. Standing constraints have, however, limited NGOs’ abilities to access the courts to prevent or remedy pollution. This article analyses the recent decision of Nigeria’s Supreme Court in Center for Oil Pollution Watch v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). It finds that environmental NGOs, previously unable to institute action under existing public interest litigation procedures, can now institute action in their own rights to prevent or remedy environmental pollution in Nigeria.

Nigeria's Court of Appeal held in Shell v Federal Inland Revenue Service (Shell v FIRS) that only Nigerian enrolled legal practitioners can sign processes for arbitration proceedings in Nigeria. Foreign qualified legal practitioners (FQLP) not enrolled in Nigeria are excluded. Arguably, this limitation extends to the conduct of the parties’ cases and excludes FQLP from appointment as arbitrators where the arbitration agreement specifies that arbitrators be legal practitioners. Shell v FIRS however, contrasts with Stabilini Visinoni v Mallinson, in which the same Court of Appeal had emphasized the flexibility of the arbitral process (which typifies judicial policy in any arbitration-friendly jurisdiction), particularly recognizing that arbitration practice is open to lawyers and non-lawyers alike. Consequently, this note recommends that Nigeria's Arbitration Act be amended to allow for representation by “persons” of the parties’ choice, mirroring the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration 2013 and article 5 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010.

Parties find it difficult to determine which Nigerian High Court should intervene in the appointment of arbitrators due to conflicting judicial precedents. This perennial challenge has defied any legal solution. Considering relevant case law, this article examines the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (ACA) vis-à-vis the Nigerian Constitution. The main argument is that the Nigerian Constitution read alongside the ACA confers the Federal High Court with additional jurisdiction to appoint arbitrators regardless of which court has jurisdiction concerning the underlying dispute. There are also uncertainties regarding the intervention jurisdiction of Nigeria's National Industrial Court to appoint arbitrators. Currently, no other court can exercise intervention jurisdiction in employment disputes. This article analyses recent decisions of the National Industrial Court and argues that this Court can only intervene to appoint arbitrators where both parties request the appointment in a pending action before the Court. It is also argued that decisions concerning the appointment of arbitrators through judicial intervention can be appealed.

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