Presidential System Government as the result of 1945 Constitution Amandments has not been accomplised yet since its implementation reminds anomaly. President (executive) in presidential system has decision authority to produce acts with House of Representatives (DPR), without involving People Council (DPD) as one of parlement chambers. To restore DPD legislation role, Constitutional Court Decision No. 91/PUU-X/2012 states that DPD has equal position with DPR and President in acts establishment. It implicates that DPD should be involved since the legislation planning, but still does not have authority to make decision even for bills concerned with its authority. This Constitutional Court brings about the trilateral relationship model in legislation process without any institutional construction towards interchambers relation between DPD and DPR. It will result in Judicial Review despite the involvement of DPD in phase 1 and 2 Process, since this involvement does not bind DPR and President. Sistem pemerintahan presidensial hasil revisi UUD 1945 belum tuntas karena implementasinya masih memunculkan keganjilan, Presiden (eksekutif) dalam sistem presidensial ikut mengambil keputusan untuk menghasilkan undang-undang bersama DPR, tanpa pelibatan peran DPD sebagai salah satu kamar di parlemen. Untuk memulihkan peran legislasi DPD bidang tertentu, Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 92/PUU-X/2012 menyatakan bahwa DPD berkedudukan setara dengan DPR dan Presiden dalam proses pembentukan undang-undang. Implikasi dari putusan ini DPD dilibatkan mulai dari proses perencanaan legislasi, tetapi tetap tidak dapat mengambil keputusan sekalipun untuk RUU terkait dengan kewenangannya. Putusan MK melahirkan model hubungan trilateral proses legislasi tanpa ada konstruksi secara kelembagaan terhadap hubungan interkameral antara DPR dan DPD. Hal ini akan akan berdampak pada pengujian undang-undang, walaupun DPD telah dilibatkan dalam proses tahap 1 dan tahap 2, karena pelibatan ini tidak mengikat DPR dan Presiden.

Diskursus mengenai penetapan pembayar pajak (taxpayer) sebagai kedudukan hukum (legal standing) dalam pengujian Undang-Undang (UU) bukanlah isu yang benar-benar baru untuk dianalisis. Namun demikian, hal tersebut tetap perlu untuk diteliti dalam kerangka menggali ratio legis penetapan pembayar pajak (taxpayer) sebagai kedudukan hukum (legal standing) dalam pengujian UU oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi. Temuan dari penelitian ini merupakan bagian yang tidak terpisahkan dari penelitian hukum dalam studi doktoral mengenai dinamika kedudukan hukum Pemohon pada pengujian UU oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi. Penelitian ini secara spesifik menjawab pertanyaan: (a) bagaimana doktrin taxpayer sebagai kedudukan hukum dalam pengujian UU? (b) apa ratio legis penetapan pembayar pajak (taxpayer) sebagai kedudukan hukum dalam pengujian UU oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi? Penelitian ini menggunakan metode yuridis normatif, dengan menganalisis data sekunder berupa peraturan perundang-undangan, putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi, dan literatur yang terkait dengan doktrin kedudukan hukum pembayar pajak dalam pengujian UU. Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa ratio legis penetapan pembayar pajak (taxpayer) sebagai kedudukan hukum dalam pengujian UU dapat ditelusuri melalui pertimbangan hukum Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam putusan-putusan pengujian UU sejak tahun 2003-2019.

Based on the review of Indonesian Parliament's institutional history, its oversight functions existence largely determines good or poor condition of democracy and implementation of good governance principles. When it is weak or weakened, the ruling regime would tend to move away from the principles of democracy. Joko Widodo's governance conditions that tend to embrace many coalition partners in parliament, requiring revision of laws (political party and election law) in order to provide vast opportunities for the criticism measures and corrective actions from political parties, which do not collaborate with the government. Improvement of legislation should be directed to guarantee freedom of movement of political parties that do not form a coalition with the government. Therefore, those political parties can fulfill the role of a healthy opposition. Even if the parliament opposition raises have not yet to be adopted within the Indonesian governance system, at least a revision of the law aimed at guaranteeing the members of parliament (MPs) to perform their role freely according to conscience. While it cannot be separated entirely from the parties which supporting him, but the threat to be fired (recall) should be eliminated. So that MPs can still carry out the oversight role despite their political party collaborated with the government. This revision can create the oversight function of DPR as a form of real performance of a representative body to accommodate the interests of oversight of the Indonesian people, also become a reliable tool of facing the challenges of Indonesian democracy.

The discourse on limiting the legislators standing to submit a constitutional review is not an entirely new issue to analyze. However, these things still need to be examined to explore the legal ratio of limitation of the legislator’s standing to submit a constitutional review by the Constitutional Court. This research specifically answers the questions: (a) how are the dynamics of the use of the legislators standing in the constitutional review? (b) what is the legal ratio for limiting legislators standing in the constitutional review? This study uses a normative legal research method by analyzing secondary data in the form of legislation, the Constitutional Court decisions, and literature related to legislators standing to submit the constitutional review. The results of this study indicate that the legal ratio limiting legislators’ standing can be traced through the legal considerations of the Constitutional Court decisions from 2003-2019.

Following the abolishment of all controlling measures except repressive control, decentralisation triggers fundamental changes in local government administration. Tight control may obstruct regions’ autonomy and hamper central-regional relation. Proportional control is indispensable for balancing out local governments’ freedom. All monitoring measures outside Act 32/2004 are unwarranted without improvement of legal instruments at central government.Dengan menghapuskan semua bentuk pengawasan kecuali pengawasan represif, desentralisasi menciptakan perubahan fundamental dalam penyelenggaraan pemerintahan daerah. Pengawasan yang ketat dapat mengekang daerah dan mengganggu hubungan pusat-daerah. Pengawasan otonomi yang proporsional diperlukan sebagai penyeimbang kebebasan pemerintahan daerah. Bentuk pengawasan di luar UU 32/2004 cenderung berlebihan tanpa perbaikan instrumen hukum tingkat pusat.