I provide a critical survey of the role that semantics took in the several models of generative grammar, since the 1950s until the Minimalist Program. I distinguish four different periods. In the first section, I focus on the role of formal semantics in generative grammar until the 1970s. In Section 2 I present the period of linguistic wars, when the role of semantics in linguistic theory became a crucial topic of debate. In Section 3 I focus on the formulation of conditions on transformations and Binding Theory in the 1970s and 1980s, while in the last Section I discuss the role of semantics in the minimalist approach. In this section, I also propose a semantically-based model of generative grammar, which fully endorses minimalism and Chomsky’s later position concerning the primary role of the semantic interface in the Universal Grammar modelization (Strong Minimalist Thesis). In the Discussion, I point out some theoretical problems deriving from Chomsky’s internalist interpretation of model-theoretic semantics.

The starting point of this work is the notion of explanatory adequacy. After summarising and analysing the presentation that Chomsky gives of this notion in the first works of generative grammar, I consider the role that such notion has been playing in the construction of the theory of generative grammar and in the foundation of the Universal Grammar research program, focussing, in particular, on the last phase of generative grammar, that is, minimalism.

In this paper, I will focus on Chomsky’s interpretation of the notion of reference. I will summarize Chomsky’s criticisms against the externalist interpretation of such notion, and I will then focus on the internalist (and syntactic) interpretation that the MIT linguist provides. Then I will focus on the relation between the internalist interpretation and the notion of truth, discussing in particular Casalegno and Hinzen’s objections: I will point out that truth does not represent a particular problem for the internalized reference. Finally, I will show how Chomsky explains, inside the internalist perspective, the phenomenon of communication. In Conclusions, I will sketch two important points.

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