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China is implementing a pilot project to reform the property rights of farmland water facilities to solve the serious problems of chaotic end-of-pipe governance and inefficient irrigation from farmers. Based on microscopic research data of farm households in a typical pilot in Lu Liang County, Yunnan Province, in China, this study uses the Tobit model, and SEM was used to explore the impact of property rights reform on the irrigation efficiency of farmers and the potential mechanism paths. We further analyzed the differences in governance logic and irrigation efficiency between the two property rights models of “multiple cooperative governance” and “private contract governance” formed after the reform. The findings are as follows: (1) Compared with nonreformed areas, reformed areas have a higher promotion of adoption of water-saving technologies and a better quality of facility maintenance, which significantly contributes to irrigation efficiency, but farmers’ perception of water scarcity negatively affects irrigation efficiency; (2) there are differences between the “multiple cooperative governance model” and “private contract governance model” in terms of the mechanism paths to improve irrigation efficiency, resulting in different focuses between the two models, in which the former one has better irrigation efficiency while cutting off some of the farmers’ benefits and the latter benefits more farmers while losing some of the irrigation efficiency. Finally, this study recommends that China should continue to promote the reform of farmland water property rights while focusing on promoting water conservation technologies, improving the quality of facility maintenance and facility water supply capacity, enhancing farmers’ awareness of water scarcity, and implementing a more water-efficient “multiple cooperative governance model”. The results of this study provide a model with Chinese characteristics for developing property rights policies and governance models for farmland water facilities in developing countries.

Part-time farming is a common characteristic of smallholder farmers in China at present, which is expected to persist in the long term. If China is to promote sustainable agricultural development, it is important to consider the impact of part-time employment characteristics on the grain-growing decisions of smallholder farmers. To analyze the impact mechanisms of smallholder farmers’ part-time employment on their grain-growing decisions, we used data consisting of 14,539 samples collected by a survey of the former Chinese Ministry of Agriculture National Rural Fixed Observation Point from 2009 to 2015 to empirically analyze the effect of the extent of smallholder farmers’ part-time employment on their grain-growing decisions using a dynamic panel regression model. Then, we constructed a mediating effect test model using the dynamic panel regression model as the benchmark model in order to empirically test the mediating effect of the adoption of agricultural production services. The results are as follows: as the extent of smallholder farmers’ part-time employment grows, smallholder farmers significantly reduce the sown areas of wheat and corn; furthermore, the adoption of agricultural production services is an important mediating variable to curb the negative effects of the extent of smallholder farmers’ part-time employment on their grain-sowing areas, and the “Extent of Smallholder Part-time Employment (EPE)→Adoption of Agricultural Production Services→Grain-Planting Decisions” is an important path by which the extent of smallholder farmers’ part-time employment affects their grain-growing decisions. Notably, all of the findings passed the influence mechanism test and, after a robustness test, remained valid. Based on the research findings, we propose policy recommendations, suggesting that the construction of agricultural production service systems should be improved with the orientation of high-quality agricultural development; the minimum purchase prices of wheat and corn should be appropriately increased in order to ensure that smallholder farmers receive reasonable economic returns from growing grain; and the attractiveness of growing grain to smallholder farmers should be improved.

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