Purpose:\ud This paper aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on dividend policy of listed firms in Turkey. Particularly, it attempts to uncover the effects of family involvement (through ownership and board representation), non-family blockholders (foreign investors, domestic financial institutions and the state) and minority shareholders on dividend decisions in the post-2003 period as it witnesses the major economic and structural reforms.\ud \ud Design/methodology/approach:\ud The paper uses alternative dividend policy measures (the probability of paying dividends, dividend payout ratio and dividend yield) and uses appropriate regression techniques (logit and tobit models) to test the research hypotheses, by focusing on a recent large panel dataset of 264 Istanbul Stock Exchange-listed firms (non-financial and non-utility) over a 10-year period 2003-2012.\ud \ud Findings:\ud The empirical results show that foreign and state ownership are associated with a less likelihood of paying dividends, while other ownership variables (family involvement, domestic financial institutions and minority shareholders) are insignificant in affecting the probability of paying dividends. However, all the ownership variables have a significantly negative impact on dividend payout ratio and dividend yield. Hence, the paper presents consistent evidence that increasing ownership of foreign investors and the state in general reduces the need for paying dividends in the Turkish market.\ud \ud Research limitations/implications:\ud Because of the absence of empirical research on how ownership structure may affect dividend policy and the data unavailability for earlier periods in Turkey, the paper cannot make comparison between the pre-and post-2003 periods. Nevertheless, this paper can be a valuable benchmark for further research.\ud \ud Practical implications:\ud The paper reveals that cash dividends are not used as a monitoring mechanism by investors in Turkey and the expropriation argument through dividends for Turkish families is relatively weak. Accordingly, the findings of this paper may benefit policymakers, investors and fellow researchers, who seek useful guidance from relevant literature.\ud \ud Originality/value:\ud To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the link between ownership structure and dividend policy in Turkey after the implementation of major reforms in 2003

Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance structures on environmental disclosure practices in the Middle East and Africa (MEA). Design/methodology/approach The research model uses a panel data set of 121 publicly listed (non-financial and non-utility) firms from 11 MEA countries over the period 2010-2017, uses alternative dependent variables and regression techniques and is applied to various sub-groups to improve robustness. Findings The empirical results strongly indicate that MEA firms with high governance disclosures tend to have better environmental disclosure practices. The board characteristics of gender diversity, size, CEO/chairperson duality and audit committee size impact positively on MEA firms’ voluntary environmental disclosures, whereas board independence has a negative influence. Research limitations/implications This study advances research on the relationship between corporate governance structures and environmental disclosure practices in MEA countries, but is limited to firms for which data are available from Bloomberg. Practical implications The results have important practical implications for MEA policymakers and regulators. The positive impact of board gender diversity on firms’ environmental disclosures, policy reforms should aim to increase female directors. MEA corporations aiming to be more environmentally friendly should recruit women to top managerial positions. Originality/value This is thought to be the first study to provide insights from the efficiency and legitimation perspectives of neo-institutional theory to explain the relationship between MEA firms’ internal governance structures and environmental disclosures.

The impact of geopolitical risks on tourism has not received scholarly attention in the existing literature. Previous studies focus on the effects of terrorism, which is a subset of geopolitical risks. Our paper fills this gap and contributes to the literature by analyzing the vulnerability of four regional Travel and Leisure (T&L) industry stock indices to geopolitical risks. Employing traditional and quantile regression techniques, our results suggest a greater sensitivity of T&L stock returns to geopolitical risks at times the industry performs poor, except for Asia & Pacific index that is the most resilient to geopolitical events. We find that the negative effects of geopolitical risks are mostly driven by the threat of adverse geopolitical events only during period of falling T&L stock prices. However, the realization of adverse geopolitical events significantly influences T&L stocks at all times. The results provide potential insights and implications for investors and tourism stakeholders.

This paper aims to shed light on the ongoing debate of dividend policy, which is considered one of the most controversial topics in corporate finance literature. We, first, outline the main theoretical arguments of dividend policy and then critically discuss the most important and influential previous empirical studies in the dividend literature. We detect that no general consensus has yet been reached after many decades of investigation, despite extensive debate and countless research. Consequently, the main motivation for paying dividends is still unsolved and thus remains as a puzzle. In addition, there is no doubt that carrying the dividend debate into the context of emerging markets attaches more pieces to this puzzle.

Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of board independence on the cash dividend payments of family firms listed on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) in balancing controlling families’ power to mitigate agency problems between family and minority shareholders in the post-2012 period. The authors focus on this period because Turkish authorities implemented mandatory regulations on the employment of independent directors on boards from fiscal year 2012. Design/methodology/approach The research model uses a panel dataset of 153 BIST-listed family firms over the period 2012–2017, employs alternative dependent variables and regression techniques and is applied to various sub-groups to improve robustness. Findings The empirical results show a strong positive effect of board independence on dividend decisions. The authors further detect that family directorship exhibits a negative effect, whereas both board size and audit committees have positive influences but chief executive officer (CEO)/duality has had no significant impact on the dividend policies of Turkish family firms since the new compulsory legal requirements in the Turkish market. Research limitations/implications The findings suggest that independent directorship and dividend policy are complementary governance mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts between families and minority shareholders in Turkey, which is a civil law-based emerging country characterized by high family ownership concentration. Practical implications The authors present evidence that Turkish family firms’ corporate boards have evolved, to some extent, from being managerial rubber stamps to more independent boards that raise opposing voices in family decision-making. However, independent directors’ preference for dividend-induced capital market monitoring implies that their direct monitoring is less effective than it is supposed to be. This suggests a need to revise the Turkish Corporate Governance Principles to enhance independent directors’ monitoring and supervisory power. Originality/value This is thought to be the first study to provide insights on how board independence influences dividend policy in controlling agency problems in Turkish family firms since Turkish authorities introduced compulsory rules on the employment of independent directors on boards.