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When selling a home, an important decision facing the homeowner is choosing an optimal listing price. This decision will depend in large part on how the chosen list price impacts the post negotiation final sale price of the home. In this study, we design an experiment that enables us to identify how different types of common list price strategies affect housing negotiations. Specifically, we examine how rounded, just below, and precise list prices impact the negotiation behavior of the buyer and seller and, ultimately, the final sale price of the home. Our results indicate that the initial list price strategy does play an important role in the negotiation process. Most notably, a high precise price generates the highest final sale price, smallest percentage discount off the list price, and the largest fraction of the surplus to the seller, while just below pricing leads to the lowest final price, largest percentage discount, and smallest fraction of the surplus to the seller. This pattern seems to be largely driven by sellers making persistently higher and more precise counter-offers throughout the negotiation process when the initial list price is high precise. Interestingly, these effects generally attenuate with negotiating experience. Importantly, our experimental results are generally consistent, both in direction and magnitude, with the limited transactions-based empirical studies relating to real estate listing prices.

The precarious manhood paradigm posits that threats to masculinity are met with attempts to reassert masculinity. We investigated the precarious manhood paradigm as applied to investment risk and foreign/domestic investment decisions. We sampled 652 men online, and tested whether threats to masculinity resulted in increases in investment risk and domestic investments in a hypothetical investment portfolio decision task. Results indicated that there was a main effect of threat for investment risk, such that those in the threat condition were willing to invest more in riskier investments. There was also an interaction with general risk-taking, such that men lower in general risk-taking responded to the threat condition by increasing investment in riskier options, while men higher in general risk-taking did not. A main effect of condition did not emerge for domestic investment, but there was an interaction, such that men lower in financial knowledge responded to the threat condition by increasing domestic investments, but men higher in financial knowledge did not. These results suggest that threats to masculinity influence financial investment decisions, and suggest that person-level variables (e.g., risk-taking, knowledge) may buffer the effects of threats to masculinity.

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