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Interest in cross-national comparison of transitional justice mechanisms has grown recently, as has the study of truth commissions in particular. However, as is true of many emerging areas of research, progress has been hampered by significant gaps in data and by a lack of consensus as to what constitutes the universe of cases. To address this problem, this article introduces the most comprehensive truth commission database we know to be in existence. First, we describe the process of collecting information on truth commission cases and outline our logic in determining what cases to include in the database. Then, we briefly discuss the attributes of truth commission cases included in the database and explain our reasoning regarding their inclusion. Finally, we use the data to provide an overview of patterns and trends in the use of truth commissions.

Most studies of truth commissions assert their positive role in improving human rights. A first wave of research made these claims based on qualitative analysis of a single truth commission or a small number of cases. Thirty years of experience with truth commissions and dozens of examples allow cross-national statistical studies to assess these findings. Two recent studies undertake that project. Their findings, which are summarized in this article, challenge the prevailing view that truth commissions foster human rights, showing instead that commissions, when used alone, tend to have a negative impact on human rights. Truth commissions have a positive impact, however, when used in combination with trials and amnesties. This article extends the question of whether truth commissions improve human rights to how, when and why they succeed or fail in doing so. It presents a 'justice balance' explanation, whereby commissions, incapable of promoting stability and accountability on their own, contribute to human rights improvements when they complement and enhance amnesties and prosecutions. The article draws on experiences in Brazil, Chile, Nepal, South Korea and South Africa to illustrate the central argument.

The International Criminal Court’s interventions have prompted debate about the wisdom of criminally prosecuting combatants while attempting to build peace in conflict-ridden societies. Previous research fails to distinguish between different types of trials. Using a large-N dataset of three types of criminal trials undertaken during internal conflict – domestic security trials of rebels, domestic human rights trials of state agents, and international war crimes trials of both – this article tests a theory of the compellent effect of criminal prosecution on conflict termination. We find that, even when accounting for endogeneity, rebel trials are associated with a higher probability of conflict termination, while trials of state agents are weakly associated with conflict persistence. We argue that the former compel the opposition to discontinue fighting, while the latter signal to rebels a lack of government resolve. We also find that the effect of international trials, which at times appear weakly associated with conflict termination, is endogenous to international intervention more generally.

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