No abstract

Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g., audition) access to features of the world that are normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.g., vision). In this article, we address the question of which sensory modality the acquired perception belongs to. We have recourse to the four traditional criteria that have been used to define sensory modalities: sensory organ, stimuli, properties, and qualitative experience (Grice, 1962), to which we have added the criteria of behavioral equivalence (Morgan, 1977), dedication (Keeley, 2002), and sensorimotor equivalence (O'Regan & Noë, 2001). We discuss which of them are fulfilled by perception through sensory substitution devices and whether this favors the view that perception belongs to the substituting or to the substituted modality. Though the application of a number of criteria might be taken to point to the conclusion that perception with a sensory substitution device belongs to the substituted modality, we argue that the evidence leads to an alternative view on sensory substitution. According to this view, the experience after sensory substitution is a transformation, extension, or augmentation of our perceptual capacities, rather than being something equivalent or reducible to an already existing sensory modality. We develop this view by comparing sensory substitution devices to other ''mind-enhancing tools'' such as pen and paper, sketchpads, or calculators. An analysis of sensory substitution in terms of mind-enhancing tools unveils it as a thoroughly transforming perceptual experience and as giving rise to a novel form of perceptual interaction with the environment.

A book that promotes the thesis that basic forms of mentality—intentionally directed cognition and perceptual experience—are best understood as embodied yet contentless. Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of understanding basic minds—including basic forms of human mentality. Yet many of these same theorists hold fast to the view that basic minds are necessarily or essentially contentful—that they represent conditions the world might be in. In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds—basic minds—are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. Hutto and Myin oppose the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. They defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.

Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from representationalism toward pure, empirical functionalism fails to provide a substantive “mark of the cognitive” and is bereft of other adequate means for individuating cognitive activity. It also argues that giving proper attention to the way the folk use their psychological concepts requires questioning the legitimacy of commonsense functionalism. In place of extended functionalism—empirical or commonsensical—we promote the fortunes of extensive enactivism, clarifying in which ways it is distinct from notions of extended mind and distributed cognition.

Stressful life events increase the risk for psychosis, and the subjective experience of stress related to daily life activities drives moment-to-moment variation in psychotic intensity. Positron emission tomography (PET) studies suggest that dopaminergic (DAergic) activity mediates the behavioral response to an experimental stressor. However, it is not known how alterations in this DAergic stress response relate to the subjective experience of stress in real life situations assessed in momentary assessment studies. This study combined [18F]fallypride PET with an Experience Sampling ambulatory assessment approach to examine the association between the prefrontal DAergic response to experimentally induced stress and real life psychotic reactivity to the subjective experience of stress in daily life. Healthy first-degree relatives of individuals with a psychotic disorder (N = 14) and healthy controls (N = 11) participated in (a) a psychosocial [18F]fallypride PET stress paradigm and (b) an experience sampling study, using a structured diary approach. Mixed multilevel random intercept models revealed that stress-induced [18F]fallypride displacement, indicative of DAergic activity, in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) was associated with psychotic reactivity to daily life stress in the entire sample. Lower levels of [18F]fallypride displacement to stress predicted increased psychotic reactivity to daily life stress. This study combined PET neuroimaging with real life behavioral assessments in the investigation of psychotic symptoms; we showed decreased [18F]fallypride displacement to stress in VMPFC to be associated with increased psychotic reactivity to daily life stress. The preliminary evidence in this study demonstrates that it is possible to acquire a grasp on how brain function is associated with contextualized experience, which has relevance for neuroimaging studies in general.