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Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This very general characterization gives rise to a whole family of positions. I argue that not all of them are stable. The main argument in the paper is inspired by considerations in Keefe (2014), Priest (2006a), Read (2006), and Williamson (1988, and it aims at the most popular form of logical pluralism advocated by Restall (2000, 2006). I argue that there is a more general argument available that challenges all variants of logical pluralism that meet the following three conditions: (i) that there are at least two correct logical systems characterized in terms of different consequence relations, (ii) that there is some sort of rivalry among the correct logics, and (iii) that logical consequence is normative. The hypothesis I argue for amounts to what Caret (2016) calls a 'collapse problem' in form the of a conditional claim: If a position satisfies all these conditions, then that position is unstable in the sense that it collapses into competing positions. * This is the final draft of a paper accepted for publication in a special issue on logical pluralism and normativity in Inquiry.

The strategy of this paper is twofold: First, we carry out a systematic investigation of the question of what speci c kind of meaning quotation marks contribute to the overall meaning of an utterance. We consider the following kinds of meaning: literal meaning ( § . ), conventional implicature ( § . ), presupposition ( § . ), and conversational implicature ( § . ). We present arguments in favour of a pragmatic analysis of quotation marks, claiming that the notion of conversational implicature seems to be the most promising alternative: All general features of this kind of meaning are met by quotational constructions. Nonetheless, an approach based on conversational implicatures faces some problems when taking direct and pure quotations into account, namely e ects on truth-conditions and on grammaticality. Thus, our second aim is to propose acceptable solutions to these criticisms in § . Finally, in § , we consider how a radical pragmatic account of quotation could be integrated into a Neo-Gricean architecture of the semantics/pragmatics-interface. "Varieties" of QuotationTraditionally, quotation was considered a semantic phenomenon. The origin of this view can be traced back to the proper name theory advocated by Alfred Tarski ( ) and W. V. O. Quine ( ) who postulated a close connection between truth-conditions and quotation marks in the ambit of formal logic. Various theorists attacked their remarks by somewhat unfairly applying it to natural language (cf. Davidson , Washington , Cappelen & Lepore , Saka ) but even these critics more or less maintained the focus on semantics. We think it useful to reconsider this position.François Recanati recently proposed a rather pragmatic analysis, according to which at least some kinds of quotation are "a matter of what people do with words" (Recanati : ). In this paper, we want to focus on the reasons for developing a pragmatic account of quotation marks. We hope to show that conversational implicature is the most suitable level of analysis for the contribution of quotation marks as it allows to include a broader variety of quotation than other theories, namely the following types: * Thanks to all participants of the International Conference on Quotation and Meaning (ICQM) at the University of Mainz, especially to Manuel Garcia Carpintero, Bart Geurts, Mikhail Kissine, and Ede Zimmermann for their valuable comments at the conference. Elke Brendel, Philippe De Brabanter, Jörg Meibauer, Paul Saka and Markus Steinbach commented on an earlier version of this paper which clari ed many points and helped to considerably improve the paper. All remaining shortcomings are due to our stubbornness.

Logical pluralism is commonly described as the view that there is more than one correct logic. It has been claimed that, in order for that view to be interesting, there has to be at least a potential for rivalry between the correct logics. This paper offers a detailed assessment of this suggestion. I argue that an interesting version of logical pluralism is hard, if not impossible, to achieve. I first outline an intuitive understanding of the notions of rivalry and correctness. I then discuss a natural account of rivalry in terms of disagreement about validity claims and the argument from meaning variance that has been raised against it. I explore a more refined picture of the meaning of validity claims that makes use of the character-content distinction of classical two dimensional semantics. There are three ways in which pluralists can use that framework to argue for the view that different logics may be rivals but could nevertheless be equally correct. I argue that none of them is convincing.