For approximately two decades, the federal regulation for third‐party election spending was the focus of repeated constitutional debate. However, with the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Harper v. Canada, a relative level of policy stability has been established. This stability permits us to evaluate the performance of spending limits according to the principles of the egalitarian model on which it is based. Using an original data set compiled from third‐party election advertising reports from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 federal elections, this article offers the first empirical analysis of this important election policy. A number of observations can be offered. First, third parties are not spending large amounts relative to spending limits. Second, despite legislative changes in 2006 banning all federal party contributions except those from individuals, there appears little strategic action by third parties in spending “around” contribution limits. During this three‐election cycle, third parties quite simply did not spend significant amounts. Current third‐party spending limits therefore appear to be situated comfortably within the expectations of the egalitarian model, though why third parties of all types spend so little remains in question.

The author thanks the editors of this journal and the article's anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Renée Longo provided excellent research assistance. The Fonds de recherche du Québec / Société et culture and Queen's University provided financial support for this research in the form of post-doctoral fellowships. CJWL/RFD

Public support is a critical component of any court’s institutional legitimacy. Understanding the roots and durability of such support is therefore crucial. This article uses survey data to explore public attitudes towards Canadian courts from 2008 to 2019. This time period is especially relevant given the comparatively tumultuous relationship between the Supreme Court and the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2006–2015). Notably, partisanship now appears to be a defining characteristic of court support in Canada, with Conservative Party supporters being less likely to support the courts. While institutional trust is also found to be a strong predictor of court support, this suggests public attitudes towards Canadian courts may no longer be as well shielded from the effects of changing political circumstances as they once were.

Deciding how to regulate money during elections is a critical policy choice faced by every democracy. Over the last two decades, both the United Kingdom and Canada have implemented substantial revisions to their electoral laws, including policy measures designed to regulate third party spending. Despite similar policy objectives, the countries’ approaches to regulation differ, leaving the potential for significant variation in third party spending outcomes. These differences between countries, with otherwise very similar policy goals and systems of government, provide a unique opportunity to build and test a comparative policy evaluation framework for third party campaign spending. By examining these differences and similarities, this article builds a framework for election policy evaluation that can be adapted to serve as a template for future policy evaluation, facilitating comparative research.

In 2006, the Canadian government introduced a new component to its process of selecting Supreme Court justices, a review committee composed of members of Parliament. Tasked with interviewing justices prior to their appointment to the bench, the committee met four times, interviewing only five of the eight judicial candidates appointed to the bench before the Conservative government announced the committee's termination in 2014. This study offers the first comprehensive analysis of the performance of this ad hoc judicial review committee. Using an original dataset, we find that MPs asked little by way of probing questions, such as those related to policy or a candidate's previous jurisprudence. However, we do find some evidence that the hearing process was used to further the political aims of the participating political parties.