Background Absence seizures are brief episodes of impaired consciousness characterized by staring and behavioral arrest. The neural underpinnings of impaired consciousness and of the variable severity of behavioral impairment observed from one absence seizure to the next are not well understood. We therefore compared fMRI and EEG changes in absence seizures with impaired task performance to seizures in which performance was spared. Methods Patients were recruited from 59 pediatric neurology practices including hospitals and neurology outpatient offices throughout the United States. We performed simultaneous electroencephalography (EEG), fMRI, and behavioral testing in children and adolescents aged 6 to 19 years with typical absence epilepsy. fMRI and EEG were analyzed using data-driven approaches without prior assumptions about signal time courses or spatial distributions. The main outcomes were fMRI and EEG amplitudes in seizures with impaired versus spared behavioral responses analysed by t-test. We also examined the timing of fMRI and EEG changes in seizures with impaired behavioral responses compared to seizures with spared responses. Findings 93 patients were enrolled between September 1, 2005 and January 1, 2013, and we captured a total of 1032 seizures in 39 patients. fMRI changes during seizures occurred sequentially in three functional brain networks previously well-validated in studies of normal subjects. Seizures associated with more impaired behavior showed higher fMRI amplitude in all three networks compared to seizures with spared performance. In the default-mode network fMRI, amplitude was 0·57 ± 0·26% for seizures with impaired and 0·40 ± 0·16% for seizures with spared behavioral responses (mean difference 017%; 95% CI: 0·11 to 0·23%; p < 0.0001). In the task-positive network, fMRI amplitude was 0·53 ± 0·29% for impaired and 0·39 ± 0·15% for spared seizures (mean difference 0·14%; 95% CI: 008 to 0·21%; p < 0.0001). In the sensorimotor-thalamic network, fMRI amplitude was 0·41 ± 0·25% for impaired and 0·34 ± 014% for spared seizures (mean difference 0 07%; 95% CI: 001 to 0·13%; p = 0.02). Seizures with impaired behavior also showed greater EEG power in widespread brain regions compared to seizures with spared behavior. Mean fractional EEG power in the frontal leads was 50·4 ± 15·2 for seizures with impaired and 24·8 ± 6·5 for seizures with spared behavior (mean difference 25·6; 95% CI: 210 to 30·3); middle leads 35·4 ± 6·5 for impaired, 13 3 ± 34 for spared seizures (mean difference 22·1; 95% CI: 20.0 to 24·1); posterior leads 41·6 ± 5·3 for impaired, 24·6 ± 86 for spared seizures (mean difference 170; 95% CI: 14·4 to 19·7); p < 00001 for all comparisons. Average seizure duration was longer for seizures with impaired behavior at 79 ± 66 s, compared to 3·8 ± 3.0 s for seizures with spared behavior (mean difference 4.1 s; 95% CI 3.0 to 5.3 s, p < 00001). However, larger amplitude fMRI and EEG signals occurred at the outset or even preceding seizures with impairment. Interpretation Impaired co...

Delusions, the fixed false beliefs characteristic of psychotic illness, have long defied understanding despite their response to pharmacological treatments (e.g., D 2 receptor antagonists). However, it can be challenging to discern what makes beliefs delusional compared with other unusual or erroneous beliefs. We suggest mapping the putative biology to clinical phenomenology with a cognitive psychology of belief, culminating in a teleological approach to beliefs and brain function supported by animal and computational models. We argue that organisms strive to minimize uncertainty about their future states by forming and maintaining a set of beliefs (about the organism and the world) that are robust, but flexible. If uncertainty is generated endogenously, beliefs begin to depart from consensual reality and can manifest into delusions. Central to this scheme is the notion that formal associative learning theory can provide an explanation for the development and persistence of delusions. Beliefs, in animals and humans, may be associations between representations (e.g., of cause and effect) that are formed by minimizing uncertainty via new learning and attentional allocation. Animal research has equipped us with a deep mechanistic basis of these processes, which is now being applied to delusions. This work offers the exciting possibility of completing revolutions of translation, from the bedside to the bench and back again. The more we learn about animal beliefs, the more we may be able to apply to human beliefs and their aberrations, enabling a deeper mechanistic understanding.Key words: delusions/behavioral neuroscience/cognitive neuroscience/computational psychiatry/associative learning The End of the World and the Beginning of a TheoryIn December 1954, the Chicago Tribune reported that Dorothy Martin was relaying a prophecy from extra-terrestrials that the world was about to end. A number of followers flocked to her but her prophecy did not manifest. She ultimately settled in Sedona, Arizona where she lived until she was 92, continuing to proselytize about aliens but evading interaction with psychiatric services. Did Martin have delusions? What about her acolytes? Defining, explaining, and ultimately understanding delusions has proven challenging (see Freeman and Bebbington, this issue). In this article, we describe how neuroscientists have tried to meet that challenge. The approach demands some simplifying assumptions. Basic neuroscience in preclinical models will not recapitulate all of the features of delusions. However, simple models can be useful.