At first glance, there is nothing in the text of rule 85(a) that excludes the application of the definition of 'victim' to the crime of aggression. However, everything turns on the concept of 'harm' and the required causal link between such harm and the crime of aggression. The following discussion will explain why rule 85(a) is open enough to sustain doubt about whether the definition of 'victim' applies to the crime of aggression. I. The Notion of 'Harm'Unlike the definition of 'victim' in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 10 the International Criminal Court definition does not require a victim to have been a target of the crime, but is instead based on the notion of harm. 11 The jurisprudence of the Court on the meaning of 'harm' has developed for over ten years since the Court's establishment in relation to the crimes within its existing jurisdiction. As the following discussion will reveal, this jurisprudence is based on victims' rights under international human rights and humanitarian law, and assumes that a protected legal interest of the victim is necessarily affected by the crime in question. But the crime of aggression can be distinguished from the other crimes within the Court's jurisdiction, since individuals have no affected legal interest in respect of violations of the ius ad bellum. This part will argue that this distinction justifies a closer examination of the correct interpretation of 'harm' under rule 85(a) and in particular, whether such harm requires a legal interest to be affected.The victim provisions in the Rome Statute reflect a growing emphasis in international human rights law and international humanitarian law on the role of victims. 12 Victims of violations of human rights law have a right to an effective remedy. 13 Aspects of the right to a remedy include the right to justice, the right to

No abstract

In Resolution 2532 (2020), the UN Security Council characterised the COVID-19 pandemic as an endangerment to international peace and security and, for the first time, demanded a general ceasefire and humanitarian pause in armed conflicts across the globe. This article analyses the resolution and its broader implications. In particular, it examines the significance of the Council’s characterisation of the COVID-19 pandemic, the binding powers of the Security Council for addressing threats to international peace and security which are not ‘threats to the peace’, and the implications for the Council’s mandate and the collective security framework. This article argues that the concept of ‘international peace and security’ under Article 24(1) of the United Nations (UN) Charter – rather than Article 39 ‘threats to the peace’ – is fundamental to the delimitation of the Security Council’s mandate and powers for addressing non-traditional threats to international peace and security such as pandemics and the climate crisis.

No abstract