A wealth of research demonstrates attentional biases toward threat in the anxiety disorders. Several models have been advanced to explain these biases in anxiety, yet the mechanisms comprising and mediating the biases remain unclear. In the present article, we review evidence regarding the mechanisms of attentional biases through careful examination of the components of attentional bias, the mechanisms underlying these components, and the stage of information processing during which the biases occur. Facilitated attention, difficulty in disengagement, and attentional avoidance comprise the components of attentional bias. A threat detection mechanism likely underlies facilitated attention, a process that may be neurally centered around the amygdala. Attentional control ability likely underlies difficulty in disengagement, emotion regulation goals likely underly attentional avoidance, and both of these processes may be neurally centered around prefrontal cortex functioning. The threat detection mechanism may be a mostly automatic process, attentional avoidance may be a mostly strategic process, and difficulty in disengagement may be a mixture of automatic and strategic processing. Recommendations for future research are discussed. Keywords anxiety; attentional bias; information processing bias Mechanisms of Attentional Biases towards Threat in the Anxiety Disorders: An Integrative ReviewAn attentional bias towards threat refers to differential attentional allocation towards threatening stimuli relative to neutral stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007;MacLeod et al., 1986;. A wealth of research demonstrates that anxious individuals display an attentional bias towards threatening sources of information, and this effect is less consistent or typically not observed in non-anxious individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007;Williams et al., 1996). While the attentional bias effect has been systematically demonstrated numerous times in anxious populations, the exact mechanisms that comprise and © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.*To whom correspondence should be directed: 216 Memorial Hall, Psychology Department,University of Arkansas, 72701, jcisler@uark.edu. Publisher's Disclaimer: This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final citable form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. underlie attentional biases remain unexplained. Several theoretical models have been advanced to account for attentional biases towards threat in anxiety; however, these models have not been evaluated systematically in light of emerging empirical data. The purpose of this paper is to review the relevant theoretical models and empirical data in order to further illuminate the mec...

Persisting negative thoughts are considered a hallmark feature of depression. Recent information-processing approaches have begun to uncover the underlying mechanisms of depressive rumination. Despite marked advances in this area, there is a lack of integration between psychopathology and cognitive (neuro)science research. We propose the "impaired disengagement" hypothesis as a unifying framework between both approaches. The core tenet of our model is that prolonged processing of self-referent material is due to impaired attentional disengagement from negative self-referent information. We discuss the empirical evidence for this framework and outline future ways in which the causal predictions of this model can be tested. The proposed framework can account for the effectiveness of various treatments for depression and may aid in devising new interventions to target depressive cognition.

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Prominent cognitive theories postulate that an attentional bias toward threatening information contributes to the etiology, maintenance, or exacerbation of fear and anxiety. In this review, we investigate to what extent these causal claims are supported by sound empirical evidence. Although differences in attentional bias are associated with differences in fear and anxiety, this association does not emerge consistently. Moreover, there is only limited evidence that individual differences in attentional bias are related to individual differences in fear or anxiety. In line with a causal relation, some studies show that attentional bias precedes fear or anxiety in time. However, other studies show that fear and anxiety can precede the onset of attentional bias, suggesting circular or reciprocal causality. Importantly, a recent line of experimental research shows that changes in attentional bias can lead to changes in anxiety. Yet changes in fear and anxiety also lead to changes in attentional bias, which confirms that the relation between attentional bias and fear and anxiety is unlikely to be unidirectional. Finally, a similar causal relation between interpretation bias and anxiety has been documented. In sum, there is evidence in favor of causality, yet a strict unidirectional cause-effect model is unlikely to hold. The relation between attentional bias and fear and anxiety is best described as a bidirectional, maintaining, or mutually reinforcing relation.