Since the early 1970s, bankers have developed a host of new financial instruments and practices. These innovations have altered the nature of banking, and this in turn has complicated the task of banking regulation. National regulations have become largely ineffective in monitoring the safety and soundness of global banks. The resulting market changes and the growth of knowledge about the risks facing the international financial system have prompted governments to hold multilateral discussions regarding banking regulation. However, the task of international regulation has been compromised by the desire of states to attract foreign and domestic investment to the financial sector. Since states wish to create or maintain competitive banking institutions, they have often deregulated in order to provide banks with a cost advantage in the international marketplace. This “competitive deregulation” undermines collaborative efforts.Under the leadership of the United States and Great Britain, a multilateral agreement on bank capital standards was reached in December 1987. This agreement suggests that the interplay of market factors, consensual knowledge, and leadership by powerful states can lead to international policy coordination. The article describes the multilateral negotiations that led to this banking accord.

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The recent backlash against democracy in such countries as Bolivia, Venezuela, Russia, and Georgia poses renewed concerns about the viability of this regime type in the developing world. Drawing on a unique data set of every democratization episode since 1960, this book explores the underlying reasons for backsliding and reversal in the world's fledgling democracies and offers some proposals with respect to what the international community might do to help these states stay on track toward political stability. Rejecting earlier scholarship on this topic, Kapstein and Converse argue that the core of the problem is found in the weak institutions that have been built in much of the developing world, which encourage leaders to abuse their power. Understanding the underlying reasons for democratic failure is essential if we are to offer policy recommendations that have any hope of making a difference on the ground.

In the early 1980s, when the debt crisis threatened to disrupt the pattern of trade and investment flows that had evolved since the end of World War II, central bankers faced the challenge of maintaining public confidence in the commercial banks that were at the heart of the international payments system. Although the central bankers agreed that a run on one international bank could lead to a global catastrophe requiring massive government intervention, they did not initially agree on a policy project to strengthen the international payments system. In analyzing central bank cooperation and the processes leading to the adoption of a single international capital adequacy standard, this article argues that agreement on a uniform standard was due to a combination of political power and shared purpose on the part of the United States and Britain. While the article does not argue that the central bankers were an epistemic community as defined in this issue, it further explores the conditions under which epistemic communities are likely to arise.