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This article is the first step toward integrating in a single framework two previously separate lines of research on major structural decisions of life insurers. The literature has previously studied the relation between capital structure and asset risk on the one hand, and the relation between organizational form and distribution system on the other hand, without integrating them. Using life insurer data for 1993-1999, we model the four key insurer decisions of capital structure, asset risk, organizational form, and distribution system as endogenous choices in a single interrelated set of simultaneous equations. The model assesses the nature of the interactions among these decisions. The model also assesses the impact of insurers' fundamental business strategy (treated as predetermined) on these choices. The "business-strategy hypothesis" views other key decisions as jointly determined and driven by the fundamental business strategy, once the latter is set in motion. Confirming previous studies, we find a positive relation between capital ratios and asset risk. We also find an association in the simultaneous context between stock ownership and brokerage distribution, which was not found in prior studies. Stock ownership is related to greater financial and asset risk taking, whereas brokerage distribution is associated with lower risk taking. These and other results are interpreted in light of several theories, including transaction-cost economics (TCE), agency theory, and regulatory and bankruptcy cost avoidance. Deriving from these theories, the finite risk paradigm emerges as the most comprehensive interpretation of the results, as opposed to the risk-subsidy hypothesis of the impact of guarantee funds. We also find support for the notion that the business strategy drives the capital and distribution decisions, as predicted by TCE. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance.

The role of risk in the capital structure decision of firms is a vast topic in finance. Commonly, models of the interrelationship between risk and capital enumerate as many risk factors as possible by appropriate proxies, with the goal of detailing their individual effects. In this study of the life insurance industry for 1994 through 2000, we take a broader, holistic view of enterprise risk, identifying two groups of insurer risk factors that arise from the major activities of life insurers: investing and underwriting. We call the group of risk factors associated with investing "asset risk", and the group associated with underwriting "product risk". After specifying other important determinants of capital structure as controls, we allow all other risk factors to find expression in residual error. Within this framework, our focus is to compare two candidate measures for the role of proxy for asset-related risks. One measure, called "regulatory asset risk" (RAR), derives from the regulatory tradition of concern with solvency and is related to the C-1 component of risk-based capital. The other measure, called "opportunity asset risk" (OAR), is motivated by traditional finance concerns with market risk and reflects volatility of returns. Product-related risks are proxied by underwriting exposures in different product lines. We employ structural equation modeling (SEM), which uses longitudinal factor analysis. SEM is an innovative technique for such studies, in dealing effectively with multiple structural equations, autocorrelated panel data, unobserved underlying factors, and other issues that are not simultaneously addressed in other methodologies. We find that RAR and OAR are not equivalent proxies for asset risks. Although overlapping to some extent, each illuminates different aspects of the asset risk-capital interrelationship. In particular, RAR does not seem to affect the capital structure decision of small firms, although OAR does. We interpret this to suggest that small firms as a whole are not as sensitive in their capital decisions to the proxy of regulatory concerns as to the proxy of market opportunity. This contrasts with large insurers, for whom both RAR and OAR have significant effects on capital that comport with the "finite risk hypothesis". More detailed analysis suggests that the lack of effect of RAR for small insurers may result from RAR's proxying some factors that induce finite risk for part of the small insurer sample, and other factors that favor the "excessive risk hypothesis". Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2007.

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In this paper, we explore U.S. life insurers' exposure to mortgage backed securities (MBS) and its potential impact on capital should the credit ratings of these bonds be lowered. We analyse 2 years: 2003 (well before the realisation of problems with these instruments) and 2006 (immediately prior). We create five potential scenarios of different severity for recategorising MBS credit ratings and compute the theoretical impact on measured insurer asset risk, via a proxy for the C-1 component of life insurers' risk-based capital. Under all scenarios, we find large increases in assessed asset risk. We then model insurer capital structure as a function of asset risk and other factors to assess whether insurers had prepared their capital structures for the possibility of problems with these instruments. Our findings indicate not only that insurers were unprepared for MBS downgrades, but also that they reduced capital as they accumulated MBS, as though acquiring MBS should raise the overall quality of the investment portfolio. Finally, we analyse possible adjustments to capital to accommodate the now recognised increased risks of MBS. Our models suggest, for example, that an insurer with median residential MBS exposure might be expected to increase its capital by 10 per cent or more to maintain a historical relationship between capital and risk factors, in the event of a moderate recategorisation of MBS risk. Even larger adjustments are indicated should the crisis spread to commercial MBS as well.