In emergency care, fast and efficient treatment is vital. The availability of Electronic Medical Records (EMR) allows healthcare professionals to access a patient's data promptly, which facilitates the decision-making process and saves time by not repeating medical procedures. Unfortunately, the complete EMR of a patient is often not available during an emergency situation to all treatment teams. Cloud services emerge as a promising solution to this problem by allowing ubiquitous access to information. However, EMR storage and sharing through clouds raise several concerns about security and privacy. To this end, we propose a protocol through which all treatment teams involved in the emergency care can securely decrypt relevant data from the patient's EMR and add new information about the patient's status. Furthermore, our protocol ensures that treatment teams will only access the patient's EMR for the period during which the patient is under their care. Finally, we present a formal security analysis of our protocol and some initial experimental results.

No abstract

No abstract

Functional Encryption (FE) allows users who hold a specic decryption key, to learn a specic function of encrypted data while the actual plaintexts remain private. While FE is still in its infancy, it is our strong belief that in the years to come, this remarkable cryptograhic primitive will have matured to a degree that will make it an integral part of access-control systems, especially cloud-based ones. To this end, we believe it is of great importance to not only provide theoretical and generic constructions but also concrete instantiations of FE schemes from well-studied cryptographic assumptions. Therefore, in this paper, we undertake the task of presenting two instantiations of the generic work presented in [8] from the Decisional Die-Hellman (DDH) problem that also satisfy the property of veriable decryption. Moreover, we present a novel multi-input FE (MIFE) scheme, that can be instantiated from Regev's cryptosystem, and thus remains secure even against quantum adversaries. Finally, we provide a multi-party computation (MPC) protocol that allows our MIFE construction to be deployed in the multi-client model.

No abstract