This document kes bee. opproved for public release May 1969Ond sale; its distribution is unlimited. Prepared for:Office. ProblemMilitary equipment capable of operating for 48 hours oe longer is now being developed.When t'is equipment becomes available, military personnel will be able to participate in sustained rvmbat for longer periods of time than has ever before been possible. While technological advances will eiable this equipment to perform reliably over extended time periods, little is known about the effects of sustained combat on the personnel who will operate the equipment. If they re unable to maintain a satisfactory level of performance, then the new equpment will not be able to function at its maximum potential. New training programs will need to be developed, or changes in military doctrine will be necessary.A review of the psychological literature and military records pertaining to prolonged performance was conducted at the request of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Armor Agency. The review yielded little information about men's ability to perform for 48 hours or longer, and the information that was available often contained contradictions.In order to obtain more reliable information on sustained performance, a research program was developed to determine how performing for 48 hours without sleep would affect the efficiency of the work produced. Also studied were the effects of starting to perform in the morning compared to starting in the evening, and the effects of job rotation when it provides no additional rest time. ApproachThe subjects were 142 enlisted men trained in armor who were assigned to one of fourexperimental conditions. In three of these conditions, subjects worked for 48 hours with a 15-minute break after every 1% hours of work and a one-hour meal break every six hours, but with no additional time provided for sleeping., Subjects in the fourth (control) condition performed according to the same schedule except during the night hours, when they were allowed to sleep.Subjects were assigned to two-man teams. One member of each team tracked a continuously winding road on a driving simulator; the other member worked on a target detection task-attempting to detect brief, infrequent light signals preser-ted on a large screen. In two of the four experimental conditions, the subjects remained at the same task throughout the experiment; in the other two conditions, they rotated jobs after each 11/2 -hour period. In three conditions, the experiment began in the evening; in the fourth, it began in the morning., By comparing the performance scores of subjects in different pairs of conditions, the effects of sleep deprivation, starting time, and job rotation on performance were determined. ResultsSubjects who worked for 48 hours without time allotted for sleep performed significantly worse on the driving task than the control subjects, who were allowed to sleep from 0200 to 0700 each night., The difference in the performances of the two groups on the target detection task approached st...

This document kes bee. opproved for public release May 1969Ond sale; its distribution is unlimited. Prepared for:Office. ProblemMilitary equipment capable of operating for 48 hours oe longer is now being developed.When t'is equipment becomes available, military personnel will be able to participate in sustained rvmbat for longer periods of time than has ever before been possible. While technological advances will eiable this equipment to perform reliably over extended time periods, little is known about the effects of sustained combat on the personnel who will operate the equipment. If they re unable to maintain a satisfactory level of performance, then the new equpment will not be able to function at its maximum potential. New training programs will need to be developed, or changes in military doctrine will be necessary.A review of the psychological literature and military records pertaining to prolonged performance was conducted at the request of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Armor Agency. The review yielded little information about men's ability to perform for 48 hours or longer, and the information that was available often contained contradictions.In order to obtain more reliable information on sustained performance, a research program was developed to determine how performing for 48 hours without sleep would affect the efficiency of the work produced. Also studied were the effects of starting to perform in the morning compared to starting in the evening, and the effects of job rotation when it provides no additional rest time. ApproachThe subjects were 142 enlisted men trained in armor who were assigned to one of fourexperimental conditions. In three of these conditions, subjects worked for 48 hours with a 15-minute break after every 1% hours of work and a one-hour meal break every six hours, but with no additional time provided for sleeping., Subjects in the fourth (control) condition performed according to the same schedule except during the night hours, when they were allowed to sleep.Subjects were assigned to two-man teams. One member of each team tracked a continuously winding road on a driving simulator; the other member worked on a target detection task-attempting to detect brief, infrequent light signals preser-ted on a large screen. In two of the four experimental conditions, the subjects remained at the same task throughout the experiment; in the other two conditions, they rotated jobs after each 11/2 -hour period. In three conditions, the experiment began in the evening; in the fourth, it began in the morning., By comparing the performance scores of subjects in different pairs of conditions, the effects of sleep deprivation, starting time, and job rotation on performance were determined. ResultsSubjects who worked for 48 hours without time allotted for sleep performed significantly worse on the driving task than the control subjects, who were allowed to sleep from 0200 to 0700 each night., The difference in the performances of the two groups on the target detection task approached st...

No abstract

I. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER ARI Research Report 1394 1 4. TITLE (and saltoe S. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOO COVERED DEVELOPMENT OF THE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR Final Report UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGIE(Uhu, Data EaaMuN0* ARI Research Report 1394 20, (Continued) to train command, control, and communication skills in a classroom environment. The functional requirements were-derived from a variety of sources including representative tank platoon scenarios, ARTEPs, situational training exercises, and battle drills. Included are the process and representation requirements for terrain, movement, detection/identification, engagement, indirect fire, communication, a resources audit, time, and post-simulation feedback. SIMCAT will consist of six networked microcomputers (four trainee stations, and stations for the opposing force and the controller/trainer). The system will use videodiscs and computer generated graphics to provide audio visual cues, inherent in tactical situations, to all/simulation participants. Voice synthesis and speech recognition technologies will permit trainees to control movement and firing using normal communication protocols.

to attitude items can be affected by many factors, including sample composition, outdated phrasing, willingness to respond candidly, influences-from other items, administrative procedures, unit or post differences, and likelihood of combat participation.,Restilts of the response comparison suggested several areas of possible similarities and differences in soldier attitudes over the-20 to 25 year period; they also showed how historical comparison can affect the interpretation of responses to these items; A review of the literature dealing with the process of attitude change gave special attention to the dissonance and functional theories of attitude change for possible implication with reference to changing soldier attitudes. Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGET(#hAen Data Pntered) 'rhe Human-Resources Research Organization (HunARO) is nonpoi fit' corporation-easablishid in 1969 to conduct research in, the field of ,trai'ilnng and education. It is a confinuaiion of, 7 he-George Washington Ufiiersityf.Humav Resourcea ResearchjOffice. HuniRRO's general purpoee Is t 'ioimprove *humun,, performance, particularly in-organizational, settings, thiough be'.aviorai,,vnd iociil science research, development, and con-su~tation. HumRRCs mission In work performed under Conftract DAHO 19-7 3-C-0004 ilth the Department of the Army is to conduct Fr iarcll in the fields 41 training, imotivation and leadership. The contents of this paper are not to be construed as an 6ff icial Department of th4 Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.