Advances in cyber capabilities continue to cause apprehension among the public. With states engaging in cyber operations in pursuit of its perceived strategic utility, it is unsurprising that images of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” remain appealing. It is crucial to note, however, that the offensive action in cyberspace has only had limited success over the past decade. It is estimated that less than 5% of these have achieved their stated political or strategic objectives. Moreover, only five states are thought to have the capabilities to inflict or threaten substantial damage. Consequently, this raises the question of what accounts for the continued sense of dread in cyberspace. The article posits that this dread results from the inappropriate use of cognitive shortcuts or heuristics. The findings herein suggest that the lack of experience in dealing with cyber operations encourages uncertainty, which motivates decision-makers to base their judgements on pre-existing, and possibly incorrect, conceptions of cyberspace. In response, the article segues into potential solutions that can mitigate unsubstantiated dread towards cyberspace by peering into the role that attributes at the organizational level can play in tempering the position of individuals. The suggested considerations are rooted in the interactions between the micro and macro level processes in forming judgments, sensemaking, and ultimately, mobilizing actions.

Disasters often produce elements of shock that may render pre-established plans for action limited or otherwise inapplicable to the current situation. Improvisation is considered to be a common response among organisations that operate in such turbulent environments. Despite the prevalence of such plans for action, existing research is reticent with regard to the processes concerning how improvisation relates to pre-established organisational goals. This study explores how improvisation can be employed by organisations to attain specific objectives, amidst the emergent nature of the initiative. Using case study narratives of three small organisations that were critical to the response after Typhoon Haiyan struck Leyte, Philippines, in November 2013, the paper demonstrates that improvisation can be absorbed as a conscious mechanism that can aid the attainment of pre-established goals. Furthermore, it conceptualises the buffering effect of improvisation to elucidate the process via which it purposefully directs an organisation to preserve and fulfil its aims.

This paper inquires how surveillance manifests in least‐ideal contexts (LICs), that is, countries with resource constraints, poor governance and proclivity for populism during COVID‐19, and its implications for crisis governance. Using the Philippines as a case, we advance three arguments. First, LICs can become spaces where inappropriate surveillance is undertaken. Second, liminal surveillance practices can become permanent policy fixtures in LICs. Finally, when a prevailing crisis approach of a government is perceived to be inconsistent with the needs of the public, it can lead to a self‐help system among various societal groups and actors. This self‐help system may not necessarily be aligned with the general direction of the national government. As a result, it can perpetuate a disjointed and maladaptive crisis governance approach, where main actors like national governments, and complementary actors like private sector firms, local government units and citizen organizations pursue goals independent of one another.

Disaster Response Organizations (ROs) must sustain performance during times of disaster, which can be characterized as a 'mess' of interrelated problems. This study seeks to understand how coordination performance of response organizations in a disaster environment is assessed through a sound theoretical framework. Dynamic Capabilities Theory is widely used as a theoretical perspective to explain sustained organizational performance in dynamic environments. In this work, the theory is applied and tested to a simulated Chemical Disaster Spill of a Barcelona-based Disaster Response Organization. The case surfaced the limited applicability of the theory. Thus, insights on potential constructs that may be needed to extend the Dynamic Capabilities Theory are brought forth. Borrowing from other fields, the authors found preliminary empirical evidence to use a theoretical perspective based on improvisational and networked/collaborative capabilities. These results may benefit ROs by providing a better understanding of how they can sustain coordination performance in turbulent and networked environments.

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