This paper provides experimental evidence of the role of higher order risk attitudes-especially prudence-in prevention behavior. Prudence, under an expected utility framework, increases (decreases) self-protection effort compared to the risk neutral level when the risk of losing part of an income exists in a future (the same) period. Motivated by these predictions that give the exact test on prudence, an experiment was designed where subjects go through higher order risk attitude elicitation and make a self-protection decision. In contrast to expected utility theory, the observed efforts are less than the risk neutral level, regardless of the timing of loss. This violation of expected utility predictions could be explained by probability weighting.

This paper provides experimental evidence of the role of higher order risk attitudes-especially prudence-in prevention behavior. Prudence, under an expected utility framework, increases (decreases) self-protection effort compared to the risk neutral level when the risk of losing part of an income exists in a future (the same) period. Motivated by these predictions that give the exact test on prudence, an experiment was designed where subjects go through higher order risk attitude elicitation and make a self-protection decision. In contrast to expected utility theory, the observed efforts are less than the risk neutral level, regardless of the timing of loss. This violation of expected utility predictions could be explained by probability weighting.

Probability weighting is a major concept for accommodating systematic departures from expected utility theory. We examine the relation between probability weighting and cognitive ability with two experiments: one recruiting subjects with a large variation in cognitive ability and the other using the within-subject manipulation of time constraints in lottery choices and cognitive tests. We find a significant association between likelihood insensitivity—the cognitive component of probability weighting—and cognitive limitation such that subjects with a lower cognitive score or more interrupted cognition due to time pressure respond less discriminately to intermediate probabilities and more over-sensitively to extreme probabilities. Our findings shed light on the sources of anomalous choices against expected utility theory. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

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This article provides experimental evidence on the impacts of irreversibility and imperfect monitoring on the efficiency and the equity of a repeated public goods game. We find that irreversibility and imperfect monitoring both lead to inefficient and unequal outcomes through different channels. Irreversibility lowers public goods contribution in earlier periods and makes the initial‐period contribution gap between two players long‐lasting. Imperfect monitoring hampers conditional cooperation and persistently reduces group contribution. A finite mixture estimation with conditional cooperators provides a coherent account of the treatment effects.