The article is based on the premise that, from a macro-economic viewpoint, cyber attacks with long-lasting effects are the most economically significant, and as a result require more attention than attacks with short-lasting effects that have historically been more represented in literature. In particular, the article deals with evaluation of cyber security risks related to one type of attack with long-lasting effects, namely, theft of intellectual property (IP) by foreign perpetrators. An International Consequence Analysis Framework is presented to determine (1) the potential macro-economic consequences of cyber attacks that result in stolen IP from companies in the United States, and (2) the likely sources of such attacks. The framework presented focuses on IP theft that enables foreign companies to make economic gains that would have otherwise benefited the U.S. economy. Initial results are presented.

The complexity of problems that engineers are being asked to solve is increasing rapidly. Effective solutions often require the integration of mechanical, electrical, computer software, chemical, and/or biological components. In order to manage this complexity, it is becoming important for all engineering students to learn how to approach the solutions to these problems using a systems perspective (Baldwin 2014). In order to better motivate this approach to students the authors are introducing it within courses of their own engineering discipline. The authors are adapting traditional systems engineering concepts to create a framework of system models that can be introduced into courses of any engineering discipline at any level. Through the process of learning how to create these models, students gain an understanding of what is meant by a systems perspective and how this perspective can help them to solve problems. This paper discusses which systems models were incorporated into undergraduate curriculum and how each model is broken‐down into pieces that are easier for undergraduates to understand and faculty to teach.

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This paper presents a methodology for modeling cloud-computing technology (CCT), its users, and, most important, would-be malicious intruders as complex interdependent and interconnected systems of systems (S-o-S). The paper posits and demonstrates that due to the inherent structure of CCT as S-o-S, users of public CCT are at a higher risk of unlawful intrusion than users of non-CCT systems. At the same time, the flexibility and the agility of CCT S-o-S provide advantages relative to most non-CCT S-o-S. The need is for the CCT community to employ these advantages as an integral part of its cyber security strategy. Our analysis builds on the following theory and methodology: we consider CCT and its users as complex interconnected hardware and software subsystems that interact as S-o-S through shared states, resources, and subsystems, which are connected in series (rather than in parallel, as is the case for most non-CCT systems); exploiting the serial connectivity of CCT S-o-S, we use fault-tree analysis to demonstrate the resulting unreliability of CCT S-o-S; building on the published literature, we incorporate Pareto-optimal frontiers to compare the risks faced by security-conscious users of CCT (e.g., large corporations) versus those faced by cost-conscious users (e.g., small or startup companies); and we show that users of CCT as S-o-S are at a higher risk than users of non-CCT systems for certain assumptions and types of cyber attacks. The paper is structured as follows: Part A outlines the characteristics of CCT S-o-S, addresses the inherent vulnerability of CCT S-o-S to cyber intrusion and attack, and provides a brief literature review; Part B offers a rationale for modeling CCT as interconnected and interdependent S-o-S; Part C demonstrates, through the use of fault-tree analysis, the higher risk faced by CCT and its users as complex S-o-S; Part D presents an economic analysis of the security of CCT as S-o-S; and Part E offers conclusions and lessons learned. C⃝ 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng 18: 284-299, 2015