Recent evidence from large-scale field experiments has shown that employers use job candidates' unemployment duration as a sorting criterion. In the present study, we investigate what underlies this pattern. To this end, we conduct a survey experiment in which employers make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who have experienced spells of unemployment of different length. In addition, candidates are rated on several statements that are central to four signals often associated with unemployment: (i) a signal of trainability, (ii) a signal of other fixed skills, (iii) a signal of skill loss, and (iv) a signal of negative evaluation by other employers. We use these ratings to estimate a multiple mediation model, in which the effect of the duration of unemployment on hiring intentions is mediated by the four signals. Our findings indicate that longer unemployment spells are mainly perceived by employers as a signal of lower motivation and, as a result, the long-term unemployed have lower chances to be hired or even be invited to a job interview. Understanding the reasons why employers are reluctant to hire the longterm unemployed is crucial to devise proper activation measures to facilitate their re-employment. Our study is a contribution in this direction.

This study empirically assesses the thesis that student employment only hurts academic performance for students with a primary orientation toward work (versus school). To this end, we analyse unique data on tertiary education students' intensity of and motivation for student employment by means of a state-of-the art moderation model. We find, indeed, only a negative association between hours of student work and the percentage of courses passed for work-oriented students.This finding may explain the contradictory results in the literature neglecting this factor.

We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor‐market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job‐vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of two policies (an extension of the waiting period before entitlement to unemployment insurance (UI) and an intensification of counselling) targeted at unemployed school-leavers in Belgium on unemployment duration and on the quality of work. Design/methodology/approach The length of both policies is sharply determined by two distinct age thresholds. These thresholds are exploited to estimate the impact within a regression discontinuity design using a large administrative data set of all recent labour market entrants. Findings The longer waiting period does not significantly impact job finding while the Youth Work Plan does increase the job-finding rate eight months after the onset of the programme. The accepted wage is unaffected, but both policies lower the number of working days resulting in lower earnings. This effect is especially prevalent for youth from low-income households. Research limitations/implications For both policies, participation was delineated by an age cut-off which was only four months apart. This sizeably reduced the width of the age window to detect a corresponding discontinuity in behaviour and hereby also the statistical power of the estimator. Additionally, due to confounding policies the estimated effects are local treatment effects for highly educated youth around the age cut-offs. Social implications The findings suggest that threatening with a sanction is not the right instrument to activate highly educated unemployed school-leavers. While supportive measures appear to be more effective, this may be partly a consequence of acceptance of lower quality jobs due to liquidity constraints and of caseworkers giving misleading advice that temporary jobs are stepping stones to long-term employment. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to estimate the impact of changing the waiting period in UI. The paper adds to the existing literature on the effects of counselling and UI design on employment and job quality.

We investigate the macroeconomic impact of public expenditure in active labor market policies (ALMPs) and passive labor market policies (PLMPs) on main employment indicators (i.e., unemployment, employment, and labor force participation) for a large and novel panel database of 121 countries (36 developed, 64 emerging and 21 developing economies). Compared to previous studies, we include for the first time evidence from developing and emerging economies and explicitly examine the possible presence of complementarities between active and passive policies. We find that the interaction between interventions is crucial, as the effect of spending in either of the two policies is more favorable the more is spent on the other. Even the detrimental labor market effects of passive policies disappear on the condition that sufficient amounts are spent on active interventions. This complementarity seems even more important for emerging and developing economies.