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This article argues that the efforts of policy‐makers to avoid conflict in the short run can be counterproductive in the long run. Not only may policy‐makers fail to reap the benefits of conflicts when they try to steer clear, but conflict may actually increase rather than diminish. We study conflict through the conceptual lens of (de)politicization in the lengthy and highly contested policy‐making process over the multibillion‐euro ‘Oosterweelconnection’ highway in Antwerp (Belgium). An in‐depth media analysis of 739 articles is combined with data from 32 narrative interviews. We conclude that efforts to end public debate through depoliticization can have a boomerang effect, in which conflict disappears only temporarily, and that these efforts can ultimately increase conflict while wasting engagement and creativity. More attention to the productive aspects of conflict is needed in public administration literature and practice.

This article investigates, through the theory of social construction and policy design, the feedforward effects of labeling on policy conflicts. It argues that such conflicts escalate when policymakers distinguish between more and less deserving and more and less powerful segments of the population. It draws on the empirical analysis of 32 narrative interviews with vital stakeholders in the conflict over the contested multibillion‐euro Oosterweelconnection highway in Antwerp (Belgium), as well as on the media analysis of 739 articles. According to such analyses, Flemish policymakers became increasingly hostile toward action groups as the latter moved beyond conventional policy‐making procedure, labeling them as a powerful but undeserving “vocal minority.” Meanwhile, they endorsed the Oosterweel policy, claiming that it represented an increasingly powerless but deserving “silent majority.” However, labeling action groups as powerful but undeserving and consequently dismissing them resulted in the escalation of a substantive policy conflict to a relational policy conflict, which became increasingly difficult to settle as parties fought each other rather than fighting over policies.

This article investigates the relationship between policy conflict and trust‐erosion. It concludes that in a context of trust‐erosion, practices to deal with conflict may backfire and lead to further conflict escalation. The article draws on an in‐depth analysis of 32 interviews with key actors in the conflict over a contested multibillion‐euro highway project in Antwerp (Belgium). It concludes that while all actors draw on the policy repertoire of “managing public support” to explain the conflict, their perspectives of what it means for a policy to have public support differ. Practices to “manage public support” that made sense from one perspective, contributed to the erosion of trust from those holding a different perspective, thus further escalating the conflict. Practices intended to end conflict proved to be fatal remedies.

This article argues that in situations of policy conflict, policymaking institutions that act as de facto conflict arbiters may escalate the conflict they are trying to settle. The role of institutions in policy conflicts is studied in the lengthy and highly contested policymaking process of the multibillion-euro 'Oosterweelconnection' highway in Antwerp (Belgium). The article concludes that while narrowing the scope of conflict through standardized institutional procedures initially disciplined the Oosterweel conflict, it ultimately drove further escalation, as residual topics of conflict remained and sought new institutional outlets. At the same time, more flexible institutions, while being able to finally settle the Oosterweel conflict, produced an agreement that remained institutionally unembedded and therefore more vulnerable to exploitation because it was not formally enforceable.