Objectives: Terrorism is becoming a priority among police agencies in many Western democracies. Scholars argue that increasing homeland security responsibilities can erode police–community relations, in that people perceive the police as neglecting local crime problems for homeland security concerns. Methods: Using Israel as a case study, we evaluate, through path analyses, whether Israeli Jews who perceive that the Israeli National Police (INP) values homeland security more than its crime responsibilities have lower evaluations of police legitimacy and, in turn, are less willing to cooperate with the police. Results: The findings demonstrate that those who believe the INP neglects its crime responsibilities for homeland security view the police as less legitimate, and lower evaluations of police legitimacy decrease willingness to cooperate. The overall indirect effect of perceived neglect on cooperation is not significant. Conclusions: Based on the findings, it is clear that perceptions of what the police ought to be doing influence legitimacy evaluations, even when controlling for key antecedents of legitimacy. The implications of these findings for policing terrorism and legitimacy studies are discussed.

In the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi, the Government of Rwanda created courts to hold hundreds of thousands of suspected g enocidaires accountable. Faced with an unprecedented volume of cases, each community elected lay judges known as inyangamugayo to preside over the court proceedings. With no prior legal training, these individuals held trials for a decade, levying sentences ranging from minor fines to life in prison. This article draws from forty-six interviews with former inyangamugayo to make two primary contributions. First, we examine how professional boundaries shifted during a period of upheaval such that laypeople performed tasks typically undertaken by professionals. Second, we highlight the centrality of social capital-and, more specifically, reputations-in the inyangamugayo's election and tasks. In doing so, we illustrate how the inyangamugayo leveraged their reputations to secure the cooperation of fellow community members in adjudicating crimes of genocide.

Despite the proliferation of transitional justice, scholars have rarely researched the emotional toll on those who implement transitional justice mechanisms. This article accordingly examines the emotion management techniques employed by eighty-five judges who served in Rwanda’s post-genocide gacaca courts. Most of the intrapersonal and interpersonal emotion management strategies we find are gendered, with men generally emphasizing strength and women underscoring empathy and understanding. Moreover, the dimensions of identity that were most salient during the conflict also shaped the judges’ interpersonal emotion management strategies. Specifically, judges who were not targeted during the genocide focused on regulating emotions tied to punishing defendants, while judges who were targeted emphasized survivors’ emotional catharses. As such, our findings show how conflict divisions and gender norms structure the expression of emotion during transitional justice processes.

Research has found that participation in transitional justice (TJ) is associated with increased social capital and decreased well-being. This article extends this scholarship by examining how TJ mechanisms affect the social capital and well-being of the people who implement them via interviews with 135 Rwandan gacaca court judges. In terms of well-being, judges discuss pride and confidence yet also highlight stress and trauma. In terms of social capital, many judges are now mediators and local leaders, though numerous judges have also experienced grudges from the families of those they sentenced. These negative consequences were particularly prominent among judges with more authority.

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