Theoretical advances in the science of consciousness have proposed that it is concomitant with balanced cortical integration and differentiation, enabled by efficient networks of information transfer across multiple scales. Here, we apply graph theory to compare key signatures of such networks in high-density electroencephalographic data from 32 patients with chronic disorders of consciousness, against normative data from healthy controls. Based on connectivity within canonical frequency bands, we found that patient networks had reduced local and global efficiency, and fewer hubs in the alpha band. We devised a novel topographical metric, termed modular span, which showed that the alpha network modules in patients were also spatially circumscribed, lacking the structured long-distance interactions commonly observed in the healthy controls. Importantly however, these differences between graph-theoretic metrics were partially reversed in delta and theta band networks, which were also significantly more similar to each other in patients than controls. Going further, we found that metrics of alpha network efficiency also correlated with the degree of behavioural awareness. Intriguingly, some patients in behaviourally unresponsive vegetative states who demonstrated evidence of covert awareness with functional neuroimaging stood out from this trend: they had alpha networks that were remarkably well preserved and similar to those observed in the controls. Taken together, our findings inform current understanding of disorders of consciousness by highlighting the distinctive brain networks that characterise them. In the significant minority of vegetative patients who follow commands in neuroimaging tests, they point to putative network mechanisms that could support cognitive function and consciousness despite profound behavioural impairment.

Objective: What mechanisms underlie the loss and recovery of consciousness after severe brain injury? We sought to establish, in the largest cohort of patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) to date, the link between gold standard clinical measures of awareness and wakefulness, and specific patterns of local brain pathology-thereby possibly providing a mechanistic framework for patient diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment development. Methods: Structural T1-weighted magnetic resonance images were collected, in a continuous sample of 143 severely brain-injured patients with DOC (and 96 volunteers), across 2 tertiary expert centers. Brain atrophy in subcortical regions (bilateral thalamus, basal ganglia, hippocampus, basal forebrain, and brainstem) was assessed across (1) healthy volunteers and patients, (2) clinical entities (eg, vegetative state, minimally conscious state), (3) clinical measures of consciousness (Coma Recovery Scale-Revised), and (4) injury etiology. Results: Compared to volunteers, patients exhibited significant atrophy across all structures (p < 0.05, corrected). Strikingly, we found almost no significant differences across clinical entities. Nonetheless, the clinical measures of awareness and wakefulness upon which differential diagnosis rely were systematically associated with tissue atrophy within thalamic and basal ganglia nuclei, respectively; the basal forebrain was atrophied in proportion to patients' response to sensory stimulation. In addition, nontraumatic injuries exhibited more extensive thalamic atrophy. Interpretation: These findings provide, for the first time, a grounding in pathology for gold standard behavior-based clinical measures of consciousness, and reframe our current models of DOC by stressing the different links tying thalamic mechanisms to willful behavior and extrathalamic mechanisms to behavioral (and electrocortical) arousal.ANN NEUROL 2015;00:000-000 T he mechanisms supporting consciousness, as well as its loss and recovery after severe brain injury, remain largely unknown. In the context of disorders of consciousness (DOC) 1 such as the vegetative state (VS) and the minimally conscious state (MCS), the lack of a mechanistic understanding of the relationship between brain damage and neurological condition has direct consequences for our ability to make accurate diagnoses, prognoses, and to develop targeted interventions, thereby raising complicated medical and ethical questions. 2Although information concerning the nature and extent of a patient's brain damage is generally taken into consideration during clinical assessments, current differential diagnosis procedures rely exclusively-as per international guidelines-on behavioral presentation. 3-5 Consequently, although our understanding of DOC is continuously increasing, 6,7 little is known about the connection between behaviorally defined clinical entities and the underlying brain damage, [8][9][10] or the degree to which standard behavior-based clinical assessments (eg, JFK View this article online at wil...

Recent research suggests that despite the seeming inability of patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states to generate consistent behaviour, some might possess covert awareness detectable with functional neuroimaging. These findings motivate further research into the cognitive mechanisms that might support the existence of consciousness in these states of profound neurological dysfunction. One of the key questions in this regard relates to the nature and capabilities of attention in patients, known to be related to but distinct from consciousness. Previous assays of the electroencephalographic P300 marker of attention have demonstrated its presence and potential clinical value. Here we analysed data from 21 patients and 8 healthy volunteers collected during an experimental task designed to engender exogenous or endogenous attention, indexed by the P3a and P3b components, respectively, in response to a pair of word stimuli presented amongst distractors. Remarkably, we found that the early, bottom-up P3a and the late, top-down P3b could in fact be dissociated in a patient who fitted the behavioural criteria for the vegetative state. In juxtaposition with healthy volunteers, the patient's responses suggested the presence of a relatively high level of attentional abilities despite the absence of any behavioural indications thereof. Furthermore, we found independent evidence of covert command following in the patient, as measured by functional neuroimaging during tennis imagery. Three other minimally conscious patients evidenced non-discriminatory bottom-up orienting, but no top-down engagement of selective attentional control. Our findings present a persuasive case for dissociable attentional processing in behaviourally unresponsive patients, adding to our understanding of the possible levels and applications of consequent conscious awareness.