In May 2000, an operator of a (60)Co industrial gamma radiography apparatus, during a routine service, was involved in a partial-body radiological accident, which caused serious injuries to his left hand. Dose reconstruction was started aiming to assess the radiation doses, in order to assist the medical staff in the evaluation and prescription of suitable medical procedures for the patient's treatment and follow-up. This work presents the dose reconstruction used for assessment of the distribution of doses on the patient's left hand, which was made using two methods: physical and computational techniques. For the first technique a physical hand simulator was built. The computational method was performed using microcomputer software for external dose calculations, named 'Visual Monte-Carlo-VMC', together with a hand voxel simulator. The values obtained through both methods for the distribution of absorbed doses on the operator's left hand were compared. About half of them were similar within a range of uncertainty of 20%.

Industrial electron accelerators are used by eight installations in Brazil, with a total of 14 machines generating electron beams. These facilities are classified into categories I or II, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) system. In category I are included the facilities with an integrally shielded unit with interlocks, where human access during operation is not physically possible owing to the configuration of the shielding. In category II are included the facilities with a unit housed in a shielded room that is kept inaccessible during operation by an entry control system. Of the 14 accelerators operational in Brazil, 11 belong to category I and three to category II. In the present work a methodology for the assessment of the radiological safety of these accelerator facilities was developed and applied, mainly on the basis of specific recommendations from the IAEA. The main safety items were evaluated at those eight installations. According to the results obtained here, no inadequacies were observed at the three installations in category II, from the radiological safety and radioprotection points of view. Nevertheless, two out of the five installations in category I showed several deficiencies. Most of these inadequacies have been corrected during this work, and the rest are in the course of being corrected.