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At the beginning of 1986, thirty-two 900-MWe and four 1300-MWe nuclear power stations were in service in France. A regulatory surveillance program is in progress concerning the base metal, weld metal, and heat affected zones of every nuclear pressure vessel; a reference metal sample is also present in each reactor. This surveillance program was implemented largely in accordance with U.S. rules. The specifications for the core shell forgings in MnNiMo low alloy steel and the associated welds require low contents in embrittling elements such as copper and phosphorus. The results presented here concern materials containing less than 0.08 wt% Cu and 0.011 wt% P, except for the welds of the first six reactor vessels, which have 0.13 wt% Cu and 0.019 wt% P maximum. The main aim is to obtain the RTNDT shift from Charpy-V tests, in relation to the fluence measured from fissile and activation dosimeters. Tensile, compact, and three-point bend specimens are also included in the capsules. Results for the first capsules removed after up to four years of operation, corresponding to fluences (E > 1 MeV) less than 1.5 × 1019 n · cm−2 (2.9 × 10−2 dpa), are presented and evaluated. The mean and upper values of the RTNDT shift are about 20 and 40°C, respectively, and there is no significant difference between parent metal and weld. A new formula to predict embrittlement has been derived from test reactor experiments, because of the strict limits on the residual element contents in French materials when compared with materials for which other formulae have been established. The surveillance program results are discussed and compared with the predictions of these formulae.

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The EUR organization was set up in the early 90’s to produce a common specification for the next LWR nuclear power plants to be built in Europe. 18 years after its foundation, the organization is well recognized and still quite active. During the last 3 years, the EUR products have mainly been evaluations of the Gen 3 LWR designs. The evaluations of the AP1000 and of the AES92 designs have been concluded in 2007 and a revised version of the evaluation of the EPR completed in 2009. Other LWR projects of potential interest for the EUR utilities, such as MHI’s APWR, are being reviewed before starting a full-scope assessment. Last, a revision C of the EUR volume 4 has been published in 2007. Coordinated actions with the other industry groups and the other stakeholders have been a centerpiece of the recent EUR strategy. In particular, the EUR and ENISS organizations have joined their efforts in nuclear safety vs. IAEA and WENRA. Also EUR and WNA/CORDEL are now working together on harmonization of the design requirements at global level. Meanwhile, the EUR organization has kept enlarging: CEZ and MVM now are active associated members and Gen-Energija from Slovenia has been invited to participate. Education and training has been dealt with actively in 2009 and 2010. The EUR organization strongly supported WNU’s “Forum on harmonization” in 2009. A more technical course about the EUR requirements is being organized in 2010 under the aegis of ENEN. Finally, a lot of preparatory material for a revision D of the EUR volumes 1 and 2 has been gathered during the last 10 years. Several options are under consideration about how to proceed towards this revision.

Plant life management (PLM) of the 58 EDF nuclear plants takes into account continuous safety improvement, high level operating and maintenance performances goals, ageing / obsolescence management, skills management. Safety approach is described through 3rd ten years safety reassessment of 34 three loops reactors (from 2009). Ageing process management principles are described in particular in relation with an anticipation approach in the field of inservice inspection, routine or heavy (repair, replacement) maintenance : pressure vessels requirements, concerning first, European and French regulation, and the EDF ones are presented. Design of European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) FLAMANVILLE 3 takes into account safety and PVP requirements which are presented, in particular break preclusion approach for the main primary loops and overpressure protection.