For a long time, consumer research has been investigated the causes of the switching behaviour of consumers in the liberalized electricity market. More recent research in decision theory suggests that consumers non-switching is based on the so-called status quo bias. The status quo bias reflects the tendency to over-proportionally stick to the current state. In an economic decision experiment, the influence of the status quo bias is empirically tested. Using a choice-based conjoint analysis, consumers are offered different variations of electricity contracts. The experimental investigation was conducted in August 2016 in the US state of California. 584 participants in total were assigned randomly in a control and an experimental group to a modified choice-based conjoint analysis. In each of the 15 conducted choice tasks, the participants had to choose an electricity contract. The difference between the control and the experimental group was only that one of the five electricity contracts in each choice task was preselected as a status quo option. The results show significant differences between the control and the experimental group in terms of part-worth utilities for attribute levels and relative importance of attributes. Contrary to the expectations of the rational choice model, the framing of the choice task with and without the preselection of a status quo option significantly influences the decision behaviour of the participants. These results raise doubts as to whether competitive markets driven by individual preferences are a good tool to reward long-term infrastructure and climate policy in the electricity market instead of political measures driven by collective choice. It seems that consumer preferences for preventing climate change are susceptible to framing effects.

Since the 1990s, consumer research has looked for causes that could explain the absence of switching behavior of electricity consumers in liberalized electricity markets. Recent decision theory findings suggest that this absence of switching behavior is due to the so-called status quo bias. The status quo bias reflects the tendency of individuals to prefer the actual situation disproportionately (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Using the insights of this particular bias, an economic experiment was designed to empirically test the influence of the status quo bias. In a choice-based conjoint analysis, subjects were repeatedly offered different variations of electricity contracts. 300 subjects were randomly assigned to either the control or the experimental group in four different treatments. In each of a total 15 decision-making situations, one electricity contract had to be chosen from the five different electricity contracts available. The only variation between the control and the experimental groups was that, in each decision situation of the three different status quo treatments, always one of the five electricity contracts was preselected by default. In accordance with a specific decision-making rule, this was always either the most renewable, the most local or the most expensive electricity contract. The results show significant differences between the control and the experimental group with respect to the part-worth utilities and the relative importance of the attributes. In contrast to the expectations of the model of rational choice, the type of framing of the choice task, whether an electricity contract was preselected by default as a status quo or not, seemed to influence the decision behavior of the subjects. The results are criticized as to whether competition in the liberalized electricity market is a suitable instrument to promote climate and infrastructure projects in the long term by the individual choice of electricity consumers, or whether political measures that are brought about by a collective decision should be preferred.

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