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Developing automated tools for sustainable film preservation of extensive historical film collections assumes an understanding of fundamental cinematographic settings. In order to be able to investigate new approaches to detect and classify cinematographic settings, this paper proposes a novel large-scale historical film dataset with cinematographic annotations (HISTORIAN), i.e., shot boundaries, shot types, camera movements. The dataset consists of 98 digitized original analog film reels related to the Second World War and 10593 film shots manually annotated with human film experts. Moreover, annotations for overscan areas such as sprocket holes are included. A baseline film analysis pipeline is introduced and evaluated. To the best of our knowledge, HISTORIAN is the first dataset that covers the challenges and characteristics of historical film documentaries and provides novel possibilities for exploring automatic film analysis tools.

We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a given Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates instance is called coalitional exchange-stable if it does not admit any exchange-blocking coalition, that is, a subset S of agents in which everyone prefers the partner of some other agent in S. The matching is exchange-stable if it does not admit any exchange-blocking pair , that is, an exchange-blocking coalition of size two. We investigate the computational and parameterized complexity of the Coalitional Exchange-Stable Marriage (resp. Coalitional Exchange Roommates) problem, which is to decide whether a Stable Marriage (resp. Stable Roommates) instance admits a coalitional exchange-stable matching. Our findings resolve an open question and confirm the conjecture of Cechlárová and Manlove [Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2005] that Coalitional Exchange-Stable Marriage is NP-hard even for complete preferences without ties. We also study bounded-length preference lists and a local-search variant of deciding whether a given matching can reach an exchange-stable one after at most k swaps, where a swap is defined as exchanging the partners of the two agents in an exchange-blocking pair.