Audit services were provided exclusively by a state entity in Iran until late 2001, when the audit market was liberalised. The liberalisation of the audit market resulted in increased competition, as more private auditors became licensed to operate and provide audit services. The present study examines the effects of audit market liberalisation and auditor type (i.e., state and private auditors) on audit opinions. It is predicted that increased competition in the audit market may reduce the relative bargaining power of auditors, which can compromise auditors' independence when issuing audit opinions. The present study also investigates whether the process of issuing audit opinions is influenced by the government, thus resulting in a lower rate of modified audit opinions issued by state auditors compared to those issued by private auditors. Importantly, this study develops an explanation based upon a bargaining power view of auditor independence in issuing audit opinions and upon the limitations of the explanation for the circumstances in which auditor and owner interests are aligned in the case of government entities. The present study analyses the data of firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange between 1999 and 2010. The findings, after controlling for auditor choice, reveal that modified audit opinions have decreased following the liberalisation of the audit market in Iran, and compared to private auditors, state auditors have issued fewer modified audit opinions. The findings suggest that increased competition in the audit market is more likely to decrease the relative bargaining power of auditors and that there is a significant concern regarding audit opinions when both auditee and auditor are state-controlled entities.

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This study investigates the effect of auditor type (private vs. state) and increased competition in an audit market on audit report lag (ARL). This is the first study to provide evidence regarding the effect of audit market competition on ARL. Utilising structure–conduct–performance theory, we predict that competition pressures private auditors to be more efficient and to have less reporting lag than state auditors. We also predict that competition among auditors after a liberalisation period forces auditors to be more efficient and to record less ARL than before. We use a unique data set in Iran, whereby the audit market liberalisation (an audit market where services were previously provided primarily by a state entity) has resulted in both state and private auditors simultaneously providing audit services. The findings are consistent with the following hypothesis, that is ARL is shorter for private auditors than it is for state auditors, and ARL decreases as competition increases in the Iranian audit market. Consistent with the structure–conduct–performance theory, the findings suggest that increased competition in the audit market results in higher efficiency, as reflected by a shorter ARL.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of auditor switching on audit fee discounting in Iran. The increased competition in the Iranian audit market following audit market liberalization in 2001 has resulted in a rapid increase in auditor switching and reduces the relative bargaining power of auditors compared to the clients. It is expected that auditor switching results in fee discounting because the relative bargaining power of an auditor (client) is likely to be at the minimum (maximum) point during the initial period of engagement. Since the increased bargaining power of a client in initial year seems to be different in the case of different type of auditor switching (from a state auditor to a private and from a private auditor to another), the magnitude of fee discounting is expected to be different. Design/methodology/approach The objective is tested using a sample of 1,022 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2010. This study applies the multivariate regression model using the first difference specification of audit fee as a dependent variable. Findings Multivariate analysis reveals that auditor switching results in 14 percent of fee discounting. In addition, the results show that 18 and 13 percent of fees discounting during the initial year of engagement arise from cases of auditor switching involving a change from state auditors to private auditors, and a change from one private auditor to another, respectively. The findings support bargaining power view explanation in relation to audit fees discounting in initial year engagement. Originality/value This study is the first to examine the impact of auditor switching (and analyzed different types of auditor switching) on audit fee discounting using the bargaining power view.