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Global income inequality is widening and carbon emissions remain high. So, reducing carbon emissions and income gap are urgent challenges. The purpose of this paper is to analysis how carbon emission efficiency influences the region income inequality. The improvement of carbon emission reduction efficiency has widened the regional income inequality with the flow of high-tech labor as an intermediary variable in China. Methods used in this article are mediating effect model and DEA method. This paper constructs a disposable income model of income and health costs, where health costs are a function of carbon reduction. If income is fixed, then the expectations of disposable income will change as the level of carbon emission reduction changes. This study finds that the disposable income expectations of high-income areas increases, while the disposable income expectations of lower-income areas decrease with the improvement of carbon emission reduction efficiency. High-income regions attract high-income labor from other regions, resulting in the widening of regional income inequality under the constraint of high cost of living. This result is verified by the data of China from 2007 to 2017. The regression model with Geordie coefficient as the dependent variable, carbon emission reduction efficiency as the core independent variable, gravitation of high-tech talent as the mediator variable, and urbanization rate, educational level, social security coverage, and highway and railway traffic mileage as control variables not only verifies the above results but also finds that high-tech talents’ flow is not the only intermediary between carbon emission reduction efficiency and regional income inequality. This paper finds that when the carbon emission reduction efficiency increases by one unit, the income inequality gap of 25 provinces increases by 0.0202 units, provinces with high carbon emission reduction efficiency increases by 0.107 units, and provinces with medium carbon emission reduction efficiency increases by 0.026 units. However, the income inequality gap of provinces with low carbon emission reduction efficiency decreases by 0.0390 units. The carbon emission reduction efficiency of the high and medium carbon emission reduction efficiency groups is proportional to the income inequality, while the low carbon emission reduction efficiency group is the opposite, when the carbon emission reduction efficiency is grouped into high efficiency group, medium efficiency group, and low efficiency group. The reason for this result is that the high carbon emission reduction efficiency of the former attracts high-income high-tech talent, while the latter's narrowing regional income inequality benefits from the reduction costs of health and the government’s ecological compensation. The effective measures to narrow the income inequality are to implement carbon emission reduction policy, industrial policy, education investment policy, and public service policy, according to the above findings.

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This paper discusses the influence of local governments over the realization of «Double First-Class» project in China. Based on the qualitative analysis of 36 universities’ mid-term reports, the spillover effect on local economic and social development was found to be enhancing the core competitiveness of local governments. Text analysis of eight local governments’ «Double First-Class» implementation reports showed that the way of their promoting the «Double First-Class» construction were investment and talent introduction. The local participation in the «Double First-Class» competition under the constraint of national financial resources leads to the Matthew effect of university development. Universities selected for «Double First-Class» will get more resources and develop better, while other universities will be left behind. Therefore, the central government needs to intervene the competition of local governments.

As a form of the informal economy, countries around the world have different policies towards street vendors. This paper constructs a law enforcement game model composed of the Chengguan, street vendors, and urban residents in China. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we achieved the evolutionary stable equilibrium points under complying with different constraint conditions by solving the replicator dynamic equations of parties in the dynamic system. Through the gradual stability analysis of the equilibrium point, the stable strategy of the evolutionary game can be calculated. It is found that the flexible law enforcement behavior of urban management departments plays an important leading role in urban street governance. Flexible law enforcement not only requires macro policy arrangements but also tests the executive wisdom of street bureaucrats.