South Africa's entry into the Second World War in 1939 was complex. The Smuts government lacked nation-wide support and experienced hostile reactions from opponents of its war policy. It was also subjected to Nazi propaganda offensives, which intensified national divisions and undermined public morale. In response, the Union authorities adopted a volunteer policy for military service and embarked on a massive drive to secure positive public opinion and national support for the war policy. This move led to the establishment of various publicity and propaganda organisations to influence public opinion and to stimulate enthusiasm for the war. However, inadequate policy direction and lacking a solid framework to guide propaganda organisation and operations created inter-agency frictions and rivalries. The study on which this article is based, examined the main propaganda agencies, the Bureau of Information (BOI), the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS), which contested one another for jurisdiction, authority and power to shape public opinion in South Africa during the war. The analysis focused on the rationale for their establishment, their purpose, objectives and activities. Then the article reports on the interinstitutional relationships, organisational politics and competition, and how these aspects affected the Union's propaganda enterprise, mobilisation drive and the prosecution of the war effort.

War creates a huge need for labour to support the war efforts of the belligerent parties. In South Africa tens of thousands of ‘non-white’ workers were mobilised during the Second World War to satisfy the Union Defence Force’s (UDF’s) labour needs at home and abroad. This article, firstly, outlines the role of ‘non-white people’, particularly black Africans, in the UDF with special reference to those employed within the Union of South Africa. Secondly, it briefly delineates typhoid fever as an historical thorn in the flesh of military forces up to the early 20th century. It then looks briefly into the incidence of and perceptions on typhoid fever as a killer disease in South Africa on the eve of the Second World War. Against that background, the article investigates the employment of black workers on the construction of the Berg River-Saldanha Bay military water pipeline and the UDF’s response to the threat and subsequent outbreak of typhoid fever amongst the workers at the Berg River intake site in 1943. The article concludes that the public health authorities and UDF were aware of the threat of typhoid fever with regard to the Berg River water scheme, but did not take sufficient precautionary measures, which could have had serious repercussions for the Allied war effort. This incident should serve as a warning to the South African National Defence Force when deploying on peace support operations on the African continent where typhoid fever remains a serious threat next to Hiv/Aids.

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Conventional analysis of military mobilisation usually focuses on the organisation and structure of armed forces composed of the citizens of nation-states. With the rise of contemporary insurgencies and the proliferation of Islamist movements such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which includes military service by foreign nationals, there has been a growing focus on the phenomenon of transnational fighters. However, the phenomenon of transnational volunteers for military service in foreign conflicts has a long history. This was particularly evident in large-scale conflicts such as the First and Second World Wars. This chapter explores the phenomenon of volunteering for foreign wars by focusing on the dynamics of the enlistment of foreign nationals in the Union of South Africa during the Second World War (1940-1945). It seeks to establish why and how South African authorities enlisted foreign nationals in the country's Union Defence Force (UDF), and why foreign nationals decided to volunteer for military service in the Union's armed forces. The chapter broadly analyses the Union's defence policy, military mobilisation challenges, recruitment and rationale for enlistment of foreign nationals. This analysis is framed within the context of South Africa's internal political divisions at the time and anti-war resistance which impacted on the country's war effort during the Second World War.

This chapter investigates the role of Lieutenant Colonel (Dr) Ernst Malherbe, the previous Director of Census and Statistics in South Africa, as the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) during the Second World War (1939)(1940)(1941)(1942)(1943)(1944)(1945), and chiefly as the head of the Army Education Services (AES). The AES was designed to combat troop apathy, disaffection, subversion and the influence of Nazism amongst ordinary South African soldiers. Dr Malherbe played a principal role in coordinating intelligence and facilitating propaganda within the Union Defence Force (UDF) to secure loyalty and to sustain the morale of the troops. His role is examined within the context of the growing Nazi-inspired political activism, subversive activities and other factors which undermined troop morale. Drawing on the Department of Defence Archives, Malherbe Papers, Smuts Papers, Marquard Papers and Lawrence Papers, my intention is to examine Malherbe's efforts to develop the consciousness of ordinary soldiers with regard to the imperative of the government's war policy. Broadly, the chapter analyses the dynamics of the morale-building efforts among the ordinary South African troops by examining the aims, objectives, methods and techniques of Malherbe's AES programme. and its effectiveness and limitations in the context of the country's difficult internal political conditions during the war.