The Nectin cell adhesion molecule (Nectin) family members are Ca 2+ -independent immunoglobulin-like cellular adhesion molecules (including Nectins 1-4), involved in cell adhesion via homophilic/heterophilic interplay. In addition, the Nectin family plays a significant role in enhancing cellular viability and movement ability. In contrast to enrichment of Nectins 1-3 in normal tissues, Nectin-4 is particularly overexpressed in a number of tumor types, including breast, lung, urothelial, colorectal, pancreatic and ovarian cancer. Moreover, the upregulation of Nectin-4 is an independent biomarker for overall survival in numerous cancer types. A large number of studies have revealed that high expression of Nectin-4 is closely related to tumor occurrence and development in various cancer types, but the manner in which Nectin-4 protein contributes to the onset and development of these malignancies is yet unknown. The present review summarizes the molecular mechanisms and functions of Nectin-4 protein in the biological processes and current advances with regard to its expression and regulation in various cancer types. Contents 1. Introduction 2. Molecular structures of Nectin family members 3. Nectin-induced signaling during the formation of cell-cell junctions 4. Distribution and physiological function of Nectins 5. Biological role of Nectin-4 proteins in cancer 6. Nectin-4 serves as a prognostic or diagnostic marker for selected types of cancer 7. Enfortumab vedotin (EV) 8. Oncolytic virus 9. Conclusion

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We study sequential auctions as optimal mechanisms for selling multiple heterogeneous items to unit‐demand buyers. We find that as long as the items can be ordered in decreasing variation of the buyers' values, any combination of static standard auctions in this sequence achieves full efficiency and the constrained optimal revenue, subject to (BIC), (IIR), and the all‐sold constraint. In addition, with increasing threshold types and optimal static reserve prices, any l‐th price auctions in the same sequence can achieve the optimal revenue subject to (BIC) and (IIR). Our results have implications for practical auction design, such as sponsored search auctions.