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This article examines the Cyprus Emergency (1955)(1956)(1957)(1958)(1959) to test the force structure thesis. According to the thesis, armies that deploy more manpower per armored vehicle would succeed in counterinsurgency because they could win people's trust, secure intelligence from civilians, and use force selectively. Using the congruence method of within-case analysis, I show that the causal process and logic of the force structure argument are not confirmed in the favorable case of Cyprus. Despite its preference for infantry and police units, the British garrison failed to win over the people and persuade civilians to share information about the insurgent; besides, Britain's intelligence breakthroughs and selective violence did not result from the logic of the force structure thesis, nor did the conflict end as the argument would predict. Political conditions, instead, played a greater role. Ultimately, the case of Cyprus warns against the reassuring belief, inherent in the force structure thesis, that military organizational adjustments in favor of manpower can pave the way to victory against irregular opponents.

Recent historical research exposed the myth of self-restraint as the distinctive feature of British counterinsurgency during decolonisation. This article shows that the revisionist historiography of British counterinsurgency has important, but unnoticed, implications for political scientists. Specifically, historical scholarship challenges the predictions and causal mechanisms of the main social scientific theses of civilian victimisation in counterinsurgency. Using revisionist historians' works as a source of data, I test those theses against Britain's decolonisation conflicts. I find that they do not pass the test convincingly. I conclude that political scientists should be more willing to explore the theoretical implications of new historical evidence on counterinsurgency campaigns.

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