This Article analyzes the central provision of the recently enacted Fiscal Compact, which directs member states of the European Union (EU) to incorporate into their constitutions a "golden rule" -that is, a requirement that yearly budgets be balanced. The purpose of the Article is to examine-by surveying the introduction of these pervasive budgetary constraints in four selected EU member states (Germany, France, Italy and Spain)-the institutional implications that the "golden rule" has on the role of the political and judicial branches, both in the states and in the EU as a whole. The Article argues that, while the domestic effects of the "golden rule" are likely to vary from one state to another, the Fiscal Compact systematically enhances the powers of the EU institutions to direct and police the budgetary policies of EU member states, thus increasing centralization in the EU architecture of economic governance. The Article then contrasts this development with the federal experience of the United States. A comparative perspective sheds light on the fact that, while most U.S. states are also endowed with constitutional "golden rules," the federal government never played a role in their adoption and is barred from interfering with the budgetary processes of the states. In conclusion, the Article suggests that an unexpected paradox emerges in the new constitutional architecture of the EU: Although in crafting the institutional response to the Euro-zone crisis state governments have repeatedly discarded a U.S.-like federal model as being too centralized and

This article explores the challenges of the extraterritorial application of the right to be forgotten and, more broadly, of EU data protection law in light of the recent case law of the ECJ. The paper explains that there are good arguments for the EU to apply its high data protection standards outside its borders, but that such an extraterritorial application faces challenges, as it may clash with duties of international comity, legal diversity, or contrasting rulings delivered by courts in other jurisdictions. As the article points out from a comparative perspective, the protection of privacy in the digital age increasingly exposes a tension between efforts by legal systems to impose their high standards of data protection outside their borders – a dynamic which could be regarded as ‘imperialist’ – and claims by other legal systems to assert their own power over data – a dynamic which one could name ‘sovereigntist’. As the article suggests, navigating between the Scylla of imperialism and the Charybdis of sovereigntism will not be an easy task. In this context, greater convergence in the data protection framework of liberal democratic systems worldwide appears as the preferable path to secure privacy in the digital age.

This article analyses from a law and policy perspectives the measures adopted by the European Union (EU) to address the devastating economic effects of COVID‐19, assessing their implications for Europe's economic and monetary union (EMU). The article first sets the background by exploring the main features of EMU before COVID‐19. Subsequently, it examines the multiplicity of policies deployed by the EU institutions to contain the socio‐economic damages of the pandemic – including, most crucially, the EU recovery fund "Next Generation EU" – and underlines their transformative effect on the EU architecture of economic governance. As the article argues, the responses to COVID‐19 have produced a significant rebalancing of EMU, bridging the asymmetry between EU monetary and economic policy. Finally, the article considers whether the COVID‐19‐related responses are likely to be only temporary, or rather a new normal for EMU, and sheds light on further constitutional adaptations which are needed to sustain this unprecedented transfer of fiscal power to the EU level.

This article examines how the Euro-crisis and responses to it have affected the horizontal relations of power between the EU Member States. It is argued that, whereas the EU institutional system had been designed since its foundation to strike a balance between state equality and state power, the Euro-crisis and the responses to it have increasingly upset this balance. A dynamic of inter-state domination is evidenced by the intergovernmental modes of governance within the European Council, as well as by the legal reforms in salient areas such as economic assistance, financial stabilisation and banking resolution, which have entrenched asymmetries between the states. In this article, it is argued that this dynamic constitutes a worrying development, given the anti-hegemonic nature of the EU integration project, and shows how intergovernmentalism paradoxically caters for powerful Member States. The article ends by considering options for institutional reforms, cautioning against the proposal to parliamentarise the EU and emphasising the potential of a new separation-of-powers system to restore a proper balance between the Member States.

Borderless cloud computing technologies are exacerbating tensions between European and other existing regulatory models for data privacy. On the one hand, in the European Union (EU), a series of data localisation initiatives are emerging with the objective of preserving Europe’s digital sovereignty, guaranteeing the respect of EU fundamental rights and preventing foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies from accessing personal data. On the other hand, foreign countries are unilaterally adopting legislation requiring national corporations to disclose data stored in Europe, in this way bypassing jurisdictional boundaries grounded on physical data location. The chapter investigates this twofold dynamic by focusing particularly on the current friction between the EU data protection approach and the data privacy model of the United States (US) in the field of cloud computing.