An accommodating monetary policy followed by a sudden increase of the short term interest rate often leads to a bubble burst and to an economic slowdown. Two examples are the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession of 2008. Through the implementation of an Agent Based Model with a financial accelerator mechanism we are able to study the relationship between monetary policy and large scale crisis events. The main results can be summarized as follow: a) sudden and sharp increases of the policy rate can generate recessions; b) after a crisis, returning too soon and too quickly to a normal monetary policy regime can generate a "double dip" recession, while c) keeping the short term interest rate anchored to the zero lower bound in the short run can successfully avoid a further slowdown.

No abstract

An accommodating monetary policy followed by a sudden increase of the short term interest rate often leads to a bubble burst and to an economic slowdown. Two examples are the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession of 2008. Through the implementation of an Agent Based Model with a financial accelerator mechanism we are able to study the relationship between monetary policy and large scale crisis events. The main results can be summarized as follow: a) sudden and sharp increases of the policy rate can generate recessions; b) after a crisis, returning too soon and too quickly to a normal monetary policy regime can generate a "double dip" recession, while c) keeping the short term interest rate anchored to the zero lower bound in the short run can successfully avoid a further slowdown.

No abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents inThe aim of this paper is to assess the impact of the interbank market on the business cycle fluctuations. In order to do that, we build a DSGE model with heterogeneous households and banks. The surplus bank can allocate its resources between interbank lending and risk free government bonds. This portfolio choice is affected by an exogenous counterpart risk shock on the interbank lending. An increase of the counterpart risk diverts funds from the interbank markets toward the risk free market. This mechanism allows us to capture the collapse of the interbank market and the y to quality mechanism underlying the 2007 financial crisis. The main result is that an interbank riskiness shock seems to explain part of the 2007 downturn and especially the rise of the interest rates on the credit market during and just after the financial turmoil. AbstractThe aim of this paper is to assess the impact of the interbank market on the business cycle fluctuations. In order to do that, we build a DSGE model with heterogeneous households and banks.The surplus bank can allocate its resources between interbank lending and risk free government bonds. This portfolio choice is affected by an exogenous counterpart risk shock on the interbank lending. An increase of the counterpart risk diverts funds from the interbank markets toward the risk free market. This mechanism allow us to capture the collapse of the interbank market and the fly to quality mechanism underlying the 2007 financial crisis.The main result is that an interbank riskiness shock seems to explain part of the 2007 downturn and especially the rise of the interest rates on the credit market during and just after the financial turmoil.Keywords: DSGE model, financial frictions, interbank market, Bayesian estimation. JEL classification codes: E30, E44, E51. * Address: Universitá Politecnica delle Marche, Piazzale Martelli n 8 Ancona, Italy. E-mail: f.giri@univpm.it. The authors are grateful to seminar participants to the CIDE WEEE 2013 in Perugia for advices and suggestions. In particular we would like to thank Piergiorgio Alessandri (Bank of Italy) for his usefull discussion. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union, Seventh Framework Programme FP7, under grant agreement FinMaP n0 : 612955 .The usual disclaimers apply.