The paper argues that kinship ties and sharing information on violent acts can be interpreted as forms of 'hostage-taking' likely to increase cooperation among cooffenders. The paper tests this hypothesis among members of two criminal groups, a Camorra clan based just outside Naples, and a Russian Mafia group that moved to Rome in the mid-1990s. The data consist of the transcripts of phone intercepts conducted on both groups by the Italian police over several months. After turning the data into a series of network matrices, we use Multivariate Quadratic Assignment Procedure to test the hypothesis. We conclude that the likelihood of cooperation is higher among members who have shared information about violent acts. Violence has a stronger effect than kinship in predicting tie formation and thus cooperation. When non-kinship-based mechanisms fostering cooperation exist, criminal groups are likely to resort to them.

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What are the conditions conducive to long-term transplantation of mafia groups in new territories? This article systematically reviews a number of factors that facilitate such an outcome and then explores two attempts at transplantation by members of the Calabria-based mafia group`Ndrangheta to the town of Bardonecchia (Piedmont region) and to Verona (Veneto region). While the former case was successful, the latter failed. The article concludes that features of the local economyFthe presence of significant sectors of the economy unprotected by the state and a local rather than export orientation Fgenerate a demand for criminal protection, and successful transplantation occurs in the presence of such a demand. Generalized migration or forced resettlement of mafiosi are not sufficient to predict transplantation. The article shows that a high level of interpersonal trust among local law-abiding residents is not sufficient to hinder mafia transplantation, contrary to established theories of social capital and trust.

This paper focuses on governance-type organised crime (OC). Firstly, it explores two cases of illegal governance in Salford (Greater Manchester) and Derbyshire by relying on a wide range of qualitative data. Next, it presents a novel instrument measuring the strength of governance-type OC, the 'Illegal Governance (i-Gov) Index'. This instrument is then included in a survey we conducted with Derbyshire Constabulary. This is the first systematic attempt to measure such crime in the UK. The paper shows that the governance dimension of OC is present in the UK, although with varying degrees of sophistication and development. While comparatively rare, this form of OC is pernicious and highly destructive of communities. This paper therefore calls for a systematic evaluation of such phenomenon across the UK, based on the i-Gov Index.