concepts ("freedom") differ from concrete ones ("cat"), as they do not have a bounded, identifiable, and clearly perceivable referent. The way in which abstract concepts are represented has recently become a topic of intense debate, especially because of the spread of the embodied approach to cognition. Within this framework concepts derive their meaning from the same perception, motor, and emotional systems that are involved in online interaction with the world. Most of the evidence in favor of this view, however, has been gathered with regard to concrete concepts. Given the relevance of abstract concepts for higher-order cognition, we argue that being able to explain how they are represented is a crucial challenge that any theory of cognition needs to address. The aim of this article is to offer a critical review of the latest theories on abstract concepts, focusing on embodied ones. Starting with theories that question the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts, we review theories claiming that abstract concepts are grounded in metaphors, in situations and introspection, and in emotion. We then introduce multiple representation theories, according to which abstract concepts evoke both sensorimotor and linguistic information. We argue that the most promising approach is given by multiple representation views that combine an embodied perspective with the recognition of the importance of linguistic and social experience. We conclude by discussing whether or not a single theoretical framework might be able to explain all different varieties of abstract concepts. (PsycINFO Database Record

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Four experiments (E1–E2–E3–E4) investigated whether different acquisition modalities lead to the emergence of differences typically found between concrete and abstract words, as argued by the words as tools (WAT) proposal. To mimic the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts, participants either manipulated novel objects or observed groups of objects interacting in novel ways (Training 1). In TEST 1 participants decided whether two elements belonged to the same category. Later they read the category labels (Training 2); labels could be accompanied by an explanation of their meaning. Then participants observed previously seen exemplars and other elements, and were asked which of them could be named with a given label (TEST 2). Across the experiments, it was more difficult to form abstract than concrete categories (TEST 1); even when adding labels, abstract words remained more difficult than concrete words (TEST 2). TEST 3 differed across the experiments. In E1 participants performed a feature production task. Crucially, the associations produced with the novel words reflected the pattern evoked by existing concrete and abstract words, as the first evoked more perceptual properties. In E2–E3–E4, TEST 3 consisted of a color verification task with manual/verbal (keyboard–microphone) responses. Results showed the microphone use to have an advantage over keyboard use for abstract words, especially in the explanation condition. This supports WAT: due to their acquisition modality, concrete words evoke more manual information; abstract words elicit more verbal information. This advantage was not present when linguistic information contrasted with perceptual one. Implications for theories and computational models of language grounding are discussed.

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