PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to evaluate Chinese indirect trade relations in the global trade network to observe if the objectives identified by Cai (2017) in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are being fulfilled, especially with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries.Design/methodology/approachUsing data from the UNCTAD (2016) for the period 2011–2015, a normalized exports network is built. It is analyzed with the Forgotten Effects Theory and the PageRank algorithm. A Monte Carlo experiment with 10,000 replicates is performed to account for its volatility.FindingsThe paper identifies one instance in which China's peripheral countries are importing raw materials and commodities -–oil products – to produce low technological value-added products, which, in turn, are exported to China. LAC countries do not have significant indirect trade relations with China when the former is the origin country, while the latter is the destination in a trade relationship. The trade network has a clear core-periphery structure, with China belonging to its core, although being only the fourth most central node in the network.Originality/valueThis paper contributes with both a new methodology for the analysis of indirect trade relations and the results found for China under the BRI and its trade relationship with LAC economies.

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The purpose of this paper is to identify the emergence of indirect trade flows prompted by the export interaction of the world’s economies. Using data on exports from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for the period 2016–2021, we construct an international trade network which is analyzed through the “forgotten effects theory” that identifies tuples of countries with an origin, intermediary countries, and a destination. This approach intends to spotlight something beyond the analysis of the direct trade network by the identification of second and third-order paths. The analysis using both network analyses, as well as the forgotten effect approaches, which show that the international trade network presents a hub-and-spoke behavior in contrast to most extant research finding a core-periphery structure. The structure is then comprised of three almost separated trade networks and a hub country that bridges commerce between those networks. The contribution of this article is to move the analysis forward from other works that utilize trade networks, including those of econometric nature—such as the ones based on gravity models—by incorporating indirect relationships between countries, which could provide distinctive and novel insights into the study of economic networks.

Purpose This paper aims to study the role of absorptive capacities in coopetitive alliances that involve leakages of sensitive private knowledge regarding firms’ production processes. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses a game theoretic approach to model a differentiated product market in which two firms asymmetrically informed about the economic value of a business opportunity must cooperate to exploit this opportunity. Under coopetition, firms gain access to their partners’ core knowledge as the result of inevitable leakages of information. Firms differ in their absorptive capacities, which affects their abilities to leverage this new knowledge outside the collaborative activity. Findings Firms with superior absorptive capacities are more likely to devise alliances whose purpose is to gain access to their partners’ core knowledge. This opportunistic behaviour does not disappear even if firms compensate their partners for the damages caused by this deceptive business practice. This paper also finds that a highly specialised product safeguards firms with limited absorptive capacities against these opportunistic behaviours. Originality/value This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the role that absorptive capacities and product specialisation play in influencing the emergence of opportunistic behaviours in coopetitive alliances. The theoretical analysis underscores the extent to which the risk of opportunism associated with the exploitation of a partner’s specific core knowledge outside the scope of the cooperative activity affects not only the nature and intensity of market competition but also the incentives to pursue coopetitive alliances.