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We assess the role of banks in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and unprecedented smallbusiness support program instituted as a response to the COVID-19 crisis in the United States. In 2020, the PPP administered more than $525 billion in loans and grants to small businesses through the banking system. First, we provide empirical evidence of heterogeneity in the allocation of PPP loans. Firms that were larger and less affected by the COVID-19 crisis received loans earlier, even in a within-bank analysis. Second, we develop a model of PPP allocation through banks that is consistent with the data. We show that research designs based on bank or regional shocks in PPP disbursement, common in the empirical literature, cannot directly identify the overall effect of the program. Bank targeting implies that these designs can, at best, recover the effect of the PPP on a set of firms that is endogenous, changes over time, and is systematically different from the overall set of firms that ultimately receive PPP loans. We propose and implement a model-based method to estimate the overall effect of the program and find that the PPP saved 7.5 million jobs.

We study a large-scale quasi-experiment in the Brazilian banking sector characterized by an unexpected and macroeconomically relevant increase in lending by commercial government banks. Using credit registry data, we find that this intervention led to a reduction in lending rates, but it did not lead to a change in private banks' credit supply. Firms reliant on government banks experienced a substantial increase in debt, and government banks faced a large increase in loan defaults driven by indebted firms. We find a small increase in employment at the firm level, suggesting limited direct benefits of the intervention. At the regional level, we find that branch presence cannot explain credit growth due to cross-market borrowing. Once we account for this channel, we find real effects at the regional level that are substantially larger than those at the firm level, emphasizing the general-equilibrium effects of large-scale interventions.

The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) was a large and unprecedented small-business support program that allocated $800 billion in loans and grants to small businesses following the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. This paper explores the optimal allocation of funds across firms and the distortions caused by allocating these funds through banks. We show that it can be optimal to allocate funds to the least or most affected firms depending on the underlying distribution of the shock that firms face, the firms' financial position, and the total budget available for the program. In the model, as in the data, banks distort the allocation toward firms with more pre-pandemic debt and those less affected by the COVID-19 crisis. We characterize how this misallocation depends on the degree of asymmetric information between banks and the government. In an empirical application of our model, we estimate the PPP's effectiveness and compare it with alternative policies. A policy targeted at the smallest firms could have increased the program's effectiveness significantly.