The question concerning whether all membranes fuse according to the same mechanism has yet to be answered satisfactorily. During fusion of model membranes or viruses, membranes dock, the outer membrane leaflets mix (termed hemifusion), and finally the fusion pore opens and the contents mix. Viral fusion proteins consist of a membrane-disturbing 'fusion peptide' and a helical bundle that pin the membranes together. Although SNARE (soluble N-ethylmaleimide-sensitive factor attachment protein receptor) complexes form helical bundles with similar topology, it is unknown whether SNARE-dependent fusion events on intracellular membranes proceed through a hemifusion state. Here we identify the first hemifusion state for SNARE-dependent fusion of native membranes, and place it into a sequence of molecular events: formation of helical bundles by SNAREs precedes hemifusion; further progression to pore opening requires additional peptides. Thus, SNARE-dependent fusion may proceed along the same pathway as viral fusion: both use a docking mechanism via helical bundles and additional peptides to destabilize the membrane and efficiently induce lipid mixing. Our results suggest that a common lipidic intermediate may underlie all fusion reactions of lipid bilayers.

Individuals differ profoundly when they decide whether to tell the truth or to be dishonest, particularly in situations where moral motives clash with economic motives, i.e., when truthfulness comes at a monetary cost. These differences should be expressed in the decision network, particularly in prefrontal cortex. However, the interactions between the core players of the decision network during honesty-related decisions involving trade-offs with economic costs remain poorly understood. To investigate brain connectivity patterns associated with individual differences in responding to economic costs of truthfulness, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and measured brain activations, while participants made decisions concerning honesty. We found that in participants who valued honesty highly, dorsolateral and dorsomedial parts of prefrontal cortex were more tightly coupled with the inferior frontal cortex when economic costs were high compared to when they were low. Finer-grained analysis revealed that information flow from the inferior frontal cortex to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bidirectional information flow between the inferior frontal cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex was associated with a reduced tendency to trade off honesty for economic benefits. Our findings provide a novel account of the neural circuitry that underlies honest decisions in the face of economic temptations.

In an empirical study, we compared how lay people judge motivation enhancement as opposed to cognitive enhancement. We found alienation is not seen as a danger associated with either form of enhancement. Cognitive enhancement is seen as more morally wrong than motivation enhancement, and users of cognitive enhancement tend to be judged as less deserving of praise and success than users of motivation enhancement. These more negative judgments of cognitive enhancement may be driven by differences in perceived fairness rather than differences in effort exerted by the user, although lay people generally see effort as necessary to deservingness of praise and success.

Money can be tainted when it is associated with direct or indirect harm to others. Deciding whether to accept “dirty money” poses a dilemma because money can be used to help others, but accepting dirty money has moral costs. How people resolve the dilemma of dirty money remains unknown. One theory casts the dilemma as a valuation conflict that can be resolved by integrating the costs and benefits of accepting dirty money. Here, we use behavioral experiments and computational modeling to test the valuation conflict account and unveil the cognitive computations employed when deciding whether to accept or reject morally tainted cash. In Study 1, British participants decided whether to accept “dirty” money obtained by inflicting electric shocks on another person (versus “clean” money obtained by shocking oneself). Computational models showed that the source of the money (dirty versus clean) impacted decisions by shifting the relative valuation of the money’s positive and negative attributes, rather than imposing a uniform bias on decision-making. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding and show that participants were more willing to accept dirty money when the money was directed towards a good cause, and observers judged such decisions to be more praiseworthy than accepting dirty money for one’s own profit. Our findings suggest that dirty money can be psychologically “laundered” through charitable activities and have implications for understanding and preventing the social norms that can justify corrupt behavior.

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