The Open RAN architecture is a promising and future-oriented architecture. It is intended to open up the radio access network (RAN) and enable more innovation and competition in the market. This will lead to RANs for current 5G networks, but especially for future 6G networks, evolving from the current highly integrated, vendor-specific RAN architecture towards disaggregated architectures with open interfaces that will enable to better tailor RAN solutions to the requirements of 5G and 6G applications. However, the introduction of such an open architecture substantially broadens the attack possibilities when compared to conventional RANs. In the past, this has often led to negative headlines that in summary have associated Open RAN with faulty or inadequate security. In this paper, we analyze what components are involved in an Open RAN deployment, how to assess the current state of security, and what measures need to be taken to ensure secure operation.

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Third-party dongles for cars, e.g. from insurance companies, can extract sensitive data and even send commands to the car via the standardized OBD-II interface. Due to the lack of message authentication mechanisms, this leads to major security vulnerabilities for example regarding the connection with malicious devices. Therefore, we apply a modular, protocol-independent firewall approach by placing a man-in-the-middle between the third-party dongle and the car's OBD-II interface. With this privileged network position, we demonstrate how the data flow accessible through the OBD-II interface can be modified or restricted. We can modify the messages' contents or delay the arrival of messages by using our fine-granular configurable rewriting rules, specifically designed to work protocol agnostic. We have implemented our modular approach for a configurable firewall at the OBD-II interface and successfully tested it against third-party dongles available on the market. Thus, our approach enables a security layer to enhance automotive privacy and security of dongle users, which is of high relevance due to missing message authentications on the level of the electronic control units.

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