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This article deals with the institutional implications for the European Union resulting from debt relations. It suggests that despite original efforts to tame them, as a consequence of a series of events both in the international monetary order and the European integration process, power games lying behind debt relations have finally sprouted – with special virulence after the great recession. Although the causes have been brewing for a long time (in this regard the end of the monetary order established at Bretton Woods and the liberalisation of capital movements have been key factors), it is only in the post‐economic crisis context that concrete examples of debt‐based power games are observable in the institutional system. In hindsight, a line can actually be drawn tracing a transformation in the principle underlying EU constitutional law and its institutions: from promoting equality among its Member States to reflecting their (now persistent and increasingly divergent) economic power.

This article proposes a debt‐based narrative able to explain both structural and substantive changes in European integration. The narrative results from a study of the dynamics of three different sources of external debt —cross‐border trade, sovereign debt and direct debt relations between member states– in the context of the successive stages of macroeconomic integration. The outcome is the identification of three cumulative orders of debt relations that can reveal the main features of the concrete constellation of power corresponding to each of those stages. Hence, cross‐border trade was decisive during the decades of monetary cooperation. Once the European Monetary Union was agreed in Maastricht, sovereign debt, as perceived by market actors, played the key role. Finally, since the sovereign debt crisis direct debt relations between member states are essential. The EU institutional system has accordingly adapted to these different constellations and nowadays guarantees the full repayment of debts to fellow member states.

In an article recently published in this journal, Steven Klein revised Karl Polanyi’s conceptualization of the relation between economy and society, and adapted it to the post-crisis European context. Klein’s reconstruction emphasized the redemocratization potential of trade unions and central banks against the pernicious effects of the commodification of labor and money on the European level. While Klein’s approach is without doubt very insightful and original, we think that some of his claims either deserve discussion or require closer elaboration. This reservation concerns the conceptual approach of setting Polanyi against Habermas as well as the critique of the role of law in the integration process. As for the latter, we think that further contextualization is needed to appreciate changing historical contexts and layers of European integration. With the objective of enriching Klein’s analysis, we first propose a way to reconcile, against what Klein suggests, Polanyian and Habermasian understandings of law and money. This theoretical background will help us, second, to explore in detail the differences between market integration and monetary integration, and in particular the role that law plays in each of these politico-economic constellations. Based on this, we will, thirdly and finally, explain how the interaction of public and private law in the context of post-crisis European integration further promotes the process of commodification, and how the configuration of law in market and monetary integration currently prevents trade unions and central banks from exerting the redemocratizing potential that Klein assigns to them.

associations have better access to executive institutions and they are most influential when the issue lobbied is not suitable for public mobilisation. Citizen groups use more outside lobbying, they do not engage in multilevel lobbying as often as business associations, and they enjoy better access to legislative than executive institutions. They are best able to exert influence when an issue has public salience and is therefore susceptible to outside lobbying. In many ways, labour unions and professional associations resemble citizen groups more than business associations. Unlike other studies relating to the interest group literature, this book is an attempt to explain interest group strategies (inside lobbying vs outside lobbying and multilevel lobbying in Europe), access and influence in one comprehensive study. Most studies in the field explore only one of these aspects. The main strength of the book is its empirical richness. The study covers a large number of groups in several countries. Contrary to the commonly used citizen groups versus sectional groups (business associations, labour unions and professional associations) classification, the authors argue that professional associations and labour unions are more akin to citizen groups rather than business groups. Therefore, the book also provides theoretical novelty which will be subjected to scrutiny by other researchers. The book will be of interest to postgraduate students and experienced scholars working on interest groups, civil society and EU studies.