Wireless Battery Management Systems (BMS) are increasingly being considered for modern applications. The everincreasing complexity and production costs of BMS modules and wired connections resulted in a necessity for new ideas and approaches. Despite this growing trend, there is a lack of generic solutions focused on battery cells' sensor readout, where wireless communication allows for a more flexible and cost-efficient sensor installation in battery packs. Many wireless technologies, such as those that use the 2.4 GHz frequency band, suffer from interference and other limitations. In this article, we present an alternative approach to communication in BMS that relies on the use of Near Field Communication (NFC) technology for battery sensor readouts. As an answer to the rising concern over the counterfeited battery packs, we consider an authentication schema for battery pack validation. We further consider security measures for the processed and stored BMS status data. To show that a general BMS application can make use of our design, we implement a BMS demonstrator using the targeted components. We further test the demonstrator on the technical and functional level, by also performing evaluation on its performance, energy usage, and a security threat model.
In modern systems that rely on the use of Battery Management Systems (BMS), longevity and the re-use of battery packs have always been important topics of discussion. These battery packs would be stored inside warehouses where they would need to be properly monitored and configured before their re-integration into the new systems. Traditional use of wired connections can be very cumbersome, and sometimes even impossible, due to the outer layers and packaging. To circumvent these issues, we propose an extension to the conventional BMS design that incorporates the use of Near Field Communication (NFC) for the purpose of wireless battery pack status readout. Additionally, to ensure that these packs are only managed by authenticated devices and that the data that is communicated with is protected against outside eavesdropping and tampering, we present a solution in the form of a lightweight security layer on top of the NFC protocol. To show the feasibility of our design, an accompanying prototype has been implemented and evaluated.
With the advent of clean energy awareness and systems that rely on extensive battery usage, the community has seen an increased interest in the development of more complex and secure Battery Management Systems (BMS). In particular, the inclusion of BMS in modern complex systems like electric vehicles and power grids has presented a new set of securityrelated challenges. A concern is shown when BMS are intended to extend their communication with external system networks, as their interaction can leave many backdoors open that potential attackers could exploit. Hence, it is highly desirable to find a general design that can be used for BMS and its system inclusion. In this work, a security architecture solution is proposed intended for the communication between BMS and other system devices. The aim of the proposed architecture is to be easily applicable in different industrial settings and systems, while at the same time keeping the design lightweight in nature.
In the last several years, wireless Battery Management Systems (BMS) have slowly become a topic of interest from both academia and industry. It came from a necessity derived from the increased production and use in different systems, including the electrical vehicles. Wireless communication allows for a more flexible and cost-efficient sensor installation in battery packs. However, many wireless technologies, such as those that use the 2.4 GHz frequency band, suffer from the interference limitations that need to be addressed. In this paper we present an alternative approach to communication in BMS that relies on the use of Near Field Communication (NFC) technology for battery sensor readouts. Due to a vital concern over the counterfeited battery pack products, security measures are also considered. To this end, we propose the use of an effective, and easy to integrate, authentication schema that is supported by the dedicated NFC devices. To test the usability of our design, a demonstrator using the targeted devices was implemented and evaluated.
Be it in the IoT or automotive domain, implicit certificates are gaining ever more prominence in constrained embedded devices. They present a resource-efficient security solution against common threat concerns. The computational requirements are not the main issue anymore. The focus is now placed on determining a good balance between the provided security level and the derived threat model. A security aspect that often gets overlooked is the establishment of secure communication sessions, as most design solutions are based only on the use of static key derivation, and therefore, lack the perfect forward secrecy. This leaves the transmitted data open for potential future exposures by having keys tied to the certificates rather than the communication sessions. We aim to patch this gap, by presenting a design that utilizes the Station to Station (STS) protocol with implicit certificates. In addition, we propose potential protocol optimization implementation steps and run a comprehensive study on the performance and security level between the proposed design and the state-of-the-art key derivation protocols. In our comparative study, we show that with a slight computational increase of 20% compared to a static ECDSA key derivation, we are able to mitigate many session-related security vulnerabilities that would otherwise remain open.
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